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1. Introduction 
Interpreting others’ actions in terms of underlying mental states is ubiquitous in adult 
human life.  For example, if I were to see my brother reaching excitedly for the cookie 
jar, I would typically assume that he wants to get a cookie, that he intends to open the 
jar and that he believes the jar to contain cookies.  That is, we commonly ascribe 
motives to the behavior of others by considering inner states such as wanting, 
thinking, intending or believing, e.g. ‘He does X, because he 
wants/thinks/intends/believes, that Y’ (also referred to as ‘theory of mind’).  Over the 
last 30 years, however, there has been much debate in psychology and philosophy 
with regard to when theory of mind arises in ontogeny and how it develops.  The 
debate was recently revived by new accumulating evidence from looking-based 
studies showing that infants, in their first and second year, already experience others' 
behavior as being driven by inner mental states such as beliefs (e.g. Kovács, Téglás & 
Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, Csibra, 2007; Surian, 
Caldi & Sperber, 2007).  The present work investigates whether infants in their 
second year - not only recognize others’ beliefs - but also actively communicate their 
sensitivity to others' beliefs when interacting with another person.   
The first chapter is organized into two parts.  The first part gives a short 
overview of relevant empirical work on theory of mind development in young 
children.  It also introduces recent looking-time results in infants and summarizes 
their theoretical interpretations, which focus mainly on cognitive information 
processing in the development of theory of mind skills.  The second part of this 
chapter introduces a second person approach to mindreading that, in contrast to 
information processing accounts, considers engagement and interpersonal interaction 
crucial to the development of understanding others' minds.  The second part also 
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advocates pointing, as opposed to looking time, as a more advanced measure of 
infants' understanding of minds.  In support of this claim, I also provide an overview 
of several pointing studies which are relevant to the topic of the current thesis.   
 
1.1.  Background 
The debate on the development of mental state understanding focused on ‘Theory of 
Mind’ - a term coined by primatologists Premack and Woodruff (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978).  Theory of mind is broadly defined as the ability to attribute mental 
states such as goals, emotions, beliefs, intentions and desires to others.  However, 
mounting evidence aimed at demonstrating mental state attribution is often criticized 
since many behaviours can typically be interpreted in both mentalistic and non-
mentalistic ways.  This is particularly true for the attribution of mental states that are 
consistent with reality, such as goals, perceptions and true beliefs (Johnson, 2000).  
Daniel Dennett (1978) suggested that the only convincing evidence for the attribution 
of mental state understanding is when a child is able to anticipate others’ false belief 
based actions.  As Dennett explains, this is because false beliefs drive behaviors not 
otherwise predicted by reality.  As an example, he states,  
 “Very young children watching a Punch and Judy show squeal in 
anticipatory delight as Punch prepares to throw the box over the cliff.  
Why? Because they know Punch thinks Judy is still in the box.  They 
know better; they saw Judy escape while Punch's back was turned.  We 
take the children's excitement as overwhelmingly good evidence that they 
understand the situation--they understand that Punch is acting on a 
mistaken belief” (Dennett, 1978, p.  569).   
1. Introduction 
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Dennett’s idea was put into practice by Wimmer & Perner (1983) as what has become 
known as the “false belief task”.  In the false belief task, a person places an object 
(e.g.  chocolate) in a certain location (e.g. in a cupboard), which then is moved in her 
absence into a new location (e.g. the drawer) while the child is watching.  
Subsequently, the child is asked where the person, upon arrival, will look for the 
object.  In order to answer the question correctly, the child has to consider that the 
person does not know that the object has been moved and is thus holding a false belief 
about the location of the object and, consequently, will look in the original location 
(the cupboard).  Thus, the child needs to understand that the actions of others are 
guided by their actual knowledge states, which can be outdated and hence, be 
mistaken.  Additionally, the child has to inhibit her own knowledge of the true 
location of the object (“pull of reality”) when answering the question.  Wimmer and 
Perner (1983) found that 4- to 6-year-olds correctly predict that the person will look in 
the location where she falsely believes the object is (cupboard), whereas younger 
children tend to answer that the person will look where the object really is (the 
drawer).  This finding has been replicated reliably in hundreds of research papers 
demonstrating that 4-year-olds answer the question correctly, whereas younger 
children consistently fail.  A meta-analysis (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001) showed 
that, despite attempts to make the test easier for younger children, for example by 
simplifying the language involved or by minimizing executive control demands by 
removing the object from the scene, no study selectively improved young children’s 
performance above chance.  From their meta-analysis, the authors concluded that the 
pattern of results reflected a genuine conceptual change in preschoolers’ 
understanding of belief, and, relatedly, their understanding of the mind. 
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However, one interesting observation had to do with children’s looking 
behaviour during the test.  Just before answering the test question, about 75 % of the 
children younger than 4 years would look to the correct location even though they 
answered incorrectly (Clements & Perner, 1994).  This finding led Clements & Perner 
to believe that children younger than 4 years might, at least implicitly (without 
conscious awareness), understand that people act according to what they know.  That 
is, young children might actually understand considerably more than what was 
suggested by children's explicit verbal responses.  Garnham & Perner (2001) followed 
up on this finding and conducted another study with children aged 2;5 to 4;7 that 
investigated whether implicit theory of mind understanding also manifests in infants’ 
spontaneous action responses.  In this study, children witnessed a puppet who left his 
ball at the bottom of one of two slides.  He then climbed to the top of the slides, and 
while his back was turned, the ball was moved in front of the other slide.  Children 
were then notified that the puppet was coming down to retrieve his ball and prompted 
to catch the puppet by moving a mat to the bottom of the appropriate slide.  Results 
showed a difference between children’s action responses and their verbal responses.  
Namely, they moved the mat reliably more often to the location where the puppet 
falsely believed the ball would be, as compared to when they answered the question 
'Where is the puppet going to look?'.  Indeed, this finding suggests that children from 
around 2;5 years onward implicitly understand that others will act in accordance with  
knowledge states other than their own, even when others’ beliefs are mistaken.   
 
1.2.  Recent looking-based studies 
The studies carried out by Perner and colleagues showed that there is a dissociation 
between verbal and behavioural responding in young children (Clements & Perner, 
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1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001; see also Low, 2010; Low & Wang, 2011).  Young 
children were able to respond correctly and pass the false belief test in one modality 
(visual orienting, spontaneous action), but not in another (verbal), suggesting an 
implicit understanding of belief-based action.  Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) were the 
first to test whether infants as young as 15 months would also show some implicit 
understanding of belief.   In a violation-of-expectation paradigm infants were shown 
familiarization trials in which an actor repeatedly reached for an object in one of two 
locations.  In the following belief-induction trial, the actor either saw the change of 
location of the object (true belief), or did not see the change of location of the object 
(false belief).  At test, the actor reached into either the box that was congruent with 
her belief or into the box that was incongruent with her belief.  Results revealed that, 
in both conditions, infants looked longer when the actor reached into the box that was 
incongruent with her belief.  An additional condition was run to confirm that infants 
did not use low-level strategies or simply expect the actor to reach where the toy 
really was, to reach where she had reached previously, or to where she had last 
attended.  Instead, infants were shown to keep track of what information the actor was 
given prior to her actions and to use the actor’s informational state, rather than their 
own, when watching her behaviour.  Surian, Caldi & Sperber (2007) replicated Onishi 
& Baillargeon’s findings in a similar change-of-location task with 13-month-old 
infants.  They showed that infants’ expectations about an agent's future actions toward 
an object indeed differed depending on the agent's previous exposure to relevant 
information about an object's location (see also Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard & 
Csibra, 2011).  Infants in this study expected a successful action only when the agent 
had informational access to the location of the desired object either by seeing the 
object (perceptual access) or by witnessing only its placement (true belief).  In 
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contrast, when the agent had no informational access to the new location of the object, 
infants expected the agent to be led by outdated information, gathered in previous 
familiarization trials (false belief) and to search for the object in the old location. 
These findings are consistent with an accumulating number of other recent 
looking-based studies revealing that infants in their second year construe others' 
actions as resulting from mental states derived from an agent’s visual information as 
well as the agent’s  tactile information (Träuble, Marinović & Pauen, 2010), false 
perceptions (Song & Baillargeon, 2008), object identity (Scott & Baillargeon, 2009) 
or non-obvious properties such as a rattling sound of an object (Scott, Baillargeon, 
Song & Leslie, 2010).  In addition, several recent studies have used looking-based 
paradigms to demonstrate theory of mind capabilities in 13-month-old children, and 
most recently, even in 7-month-old infants (Kovács, Téglás & Endress, 2010).  The 
interpretations of these data, however, differ vastly among researchers. 
 
1.3.  Theories and interpretations 
Whereas 20 years of research on theory of mind development had consistently shown 
that children younger than 4 years are not able to use others’ informational states in 
order to verbally predict behaviour, more recent looking based studies suggest that 
infants process others’ actions in mentalistic terms.  Some take this as evidence for a 
representational theory of mind in infancy while others are more reluctant to accept 
this interpretation.  Moreover, it raises the question about why young children fail 
verbal false belief tasks while infants succeed in a variety of looking based tasks.   
 Baillargeon and colleagues (2005, 2008, 2009, 2010), who have provided a 
considerable amount of the looking time data, concluded that infants in their second 
year already possess at least an implicit form of a representational theory of mind 
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which might stem from an inborn, abstract computational system which guides their 
interpretation of others’ actions.  This early system for psychological reasoning allows 
infants to represent others’ reality-congruent (true belief/ignorance) as well as reality-
incongruent (false belief) informational states.  According to these authors, young 
children fail verbal false belief tasks because the tasks require additional response 
selections (e.g. choosing the right answer) and inhibitory processes (because infants 
must inhibit their own knowledge), which might exceed their limited attentional and 
working-memory resources.  Looking based tasks, on the other hand, depend only on 
belief representation processes and don’t require response selection or inhibition.  
Surian et al.  (2007) agree with this interpretation in that they, too, take the looking 
time data as evidence for a rudimentary form of a representational theory of mind in 
infancy.  They point out the fact that infants take into account information that had 
been perceptually available to the agent only prior to his action, which demonstrates 
ascription of mental content, thus, mindreading proper, however rudimentary it may 
be.  In contrast, verbal false belief tests require the child to deploy conscious 
metacognitive inferences which might rely on linguistic and conversational 
experience that children do not develop until the age of four when they have become 
experienced verbal communicators.   
 An alternative interpretation is the ignorance interpretation, which comes in 
two versions.  Southgate, Senju and Csibra (2007) argued that infants in Onishi and 
Baillargeon’s study might have attributed only ignorance rather than a false belief to 
the agent, in which case children might follow the rule “ignorance means, you get it 
wrong” (Ruffman, 1996; Saxe, 2005).  Based on this interpretation, infants might 
expect an ignorant person to err, and thus, search in the empty location.  This would 
imply that infants do not keep track of information that had been perceptually 
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available to the agent in familiarization trials, but simply notice what the agent had 
last seen happening.  Consequently, it is possible that they might have only 
differentiated between a knowledgeable and an ignorant agent and applied a rule.  
Wellman (2010), too, favours an ignorance interpretation and comes to the same 
conclusion.  He notes that looking time studies (violation of expectation) can only 
show that infants appreciate others being aware (knowledgeable) or unaware 
(ignorant) of a certain event.  The fact that infants looked longer at belief-incongruent 
reaches merely shows that they did not expect this to happen.  However, it does not 
show that infants did expect a belief-congruent reach.  In other words, violation of 
expectation methods can not differentiate between ignorance and false belief (see also 
Hood, 2004). 
Perner and Ruffman (2005) do not believe that infants are capable of mental 
state ascription at all, and hence disregard both the ignorance and false belief 
explanations.  They propose an alternative interpretation according to which there is 
no need to assume that infants understand that mind mediates behaviour.  They 
indicate that the looking time data can be explained more parsimoniously by either 
association (actor-object-location associations) or by applying innate behavioural 
rules (people look for objects where they last saw them).  For example, the longer 
looking times for belief incongruent reaches in Onishi and Baillargeon’s study might 
be due to the formation of a new combination of an actor-object-location association, 
since the combination of elements in incongruent test trials always deviates from 
those shown in previous trials.  Based on this interpretation, infants’ processing of 
others’ actions is merely perceptual and does not involve a deeper mental 
understanding.  They further argue that a deeper mental understanding develops only 
later through enculturation into a language community.    
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 These interpretations vary in the extent to which they grant infants a 
mentalistic understanding of others’ actions.  Some assume that infants are born with 
an abstract psychological reasoning system, which allows them to attribute mental 
states to others without being aware, while others claim that the empirical findings are 
best explained by low-level processes such as association or rule use.  Still others 
argue that a deeper mentalistic understanding hinges on linguistic experience.  
However, the common underlying assumption of these interpretations is that mental 
processes are hidden behind behaviour and somehow have to be inferred or 
cognitively constructed.  Access to other minds is thought to be accomplished first 
and foremost through cognitive information processing from a third-person 
perspective.  That is, infants are portrayed as being in a position of a detached 
observer, who comes to grips with others' inner motives for action through an inborn 
psychological reasoning system or the application of rules.  Based on this view, 
infants’ perception of others' actions entails either the processing of mere physical 
movements separated from its psychological meaning (Perner et al., 2005; see also 
Gergely, 2004, for a similar conception), or is thought to be implicit and run “off-line” 
by an abstract computational system (Scott et al., 2010; Leslie, Friedman & German, 
2004).  However, these interpretations focus exclusively on the mental architecture 
required for understanding the mind, but profoundly marginalize the role of social 
processes in the construction of this architecture (Carpendale & Lewis, 2010).   
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1.4.  A second person approach to mindreading 
When taking a second person approach to understanding others’ minds, it is crucial to 
consider engagements and social interactions between individuals.  “It [second person 
approach] sees active emotional engagement between people as constituting – or 
creating – the minds that each comes to have and develop, not merely providing 
information about each other” (Reddy, 2008, p.  27).   Thus, the ability for infants to 
recognize others’ mental states arises from embodied interactions with others instead 
of arising from passive third person observations, as is implied by information 
processing accounts of mindreading (Scott, et al., 2010; Perner et al., 2005; Perner 
2010; Sirois & Jackson, 2007).  This view emphasizes that interpersonal exchange is 
what bridges the gap between first person experience and third person ascription 
(Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Herschbach, M., 2008; Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009; De 
Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Stawarska, 2009; Beebe, Knoblauch, Rustin & Sorter, 
2005; Nahum, 2008; Stern, 2004).  
A second person approach differs from pure information processing accounts in two 
important assumptions.   First, in contrast to Perner and Ruffman’s account, who 
consider infants’ perception of others’ actions as mere physical movements separated 
from its psychological meaning, second person approaches view the perception of 
others’ actions as psychologically meaningful.  That is, “[They see] minds as 
transparent within active, emotionally engaged perception” (Reddy, 2008, p.  26).  For 
example, if we see an other’s arm gesture, we don’t experience its abstract physical 
qualities like timing, intensity and shape as such, but instead, we experience the ‘how’ 
of this very arm gesture.  This may be ‘forceful’, ‘threatening’, ‘inviting’ or whatever 
inner state may be expressed by it.  The abstract physical qualities of this arm gesture 
are rather the currency of our perceptual system (Stern, 1985; 2010).  A great deal of 
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other minds is therefore thought to be transparent to perception and manifested in 
others’ embodied comportments (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Gallagher, 2004, 2001; 
Reddy, 2008).  Second, and most importantly, infants in second person approaches to 
mindreading, are seen as active participants rather than mere spectators (Hutto, 2008).  
Interpersonal interactions involve direct face-to-face connections in which both 
interactants are personally addressed. Being personally addressed entails the 
experience of being the object of others’ attention in interpersonal interactions 
(Reddy, 2003; Stawarska, 2009). Further, it involves mutual responsiveness within the 
engagement.  For example, it crucially matters whether someone’s smile is directed at 
you in direct engagement as opposed to when it is directed at someone else.  That is, I 
know you differently when I am directly engaged with you as compared to when I am 
merely watching you. “Not only is the experience of the other person more immediate 
and more powerful in direct engagement, but it calls out from you a different way of 
being, an immediate responsiveness, a feeling in response, and obligation to “answer” 
the person’s acts” (Reddy, 2008, p.  27).  Responsiveness is thus a key aspect of 
interpersonal engagement, which makes a second person approach especially valuable 
to the understanding of other minds.  It highlights the notion that infants are not 
merely passive onlookers of others' actions, but instead active responders from the 
very beginning of their lives.     
Towards the end of their first year, infants’ begin communicating about 
objects in their environment and sharing attention with others (Bakeman & Adamson 
1984).  Their social interactions thus shift from being dyadic (which do not involve 
external objects) to being triadic (which do involve external objects).  This shift is 
interesting for theory of mind research because it suggests that infants begin to take 
others’ perspectives into consideration.  The majority of studies examining the 
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development of theory of mind abilities in infancy, however, have employed looking 
time methods.  One major disadvantage of these methods is that they do not require 
the child to generate an overt response.  As Scott et al. (2010, see also Wellman, 
2010) rightly point out, in these tasks, there is no element of choice (response 
selection) on the infant’s behalf.  The possibility of choice, however, is particularly 
revealing in false belief paradigms since the relevant locations (location A versus 
location B) allow researchers to differentiate between self and other perspective.  
Interactive tasks that involve active engagement from the child are therefore 
especially informative.  We can thus gain a clearer understanding of infants’ 
developing theory of mind skills by looking into how infants spontaneously 
communicate within second person interactions in different belief contexts, for 
example through pointing (Stack & Lewis, 2008; Brune & Woodward, 2007).   
 
1.5.  Pointing in prelinguistic communication 
Around nine to 12 months, infants begin to engage in triadic social interactions which 
are focused on external objects.  Around the same time, they also begin 
communicating about objects using gestures such as showing and pointing.  As 
Tomasello (2008) explains, the physical act of pointing by itself is meaningless.  In 
order to understand why someone is pointing and to what they are referring depends 
crucially on the common ground that is shared between the communicator and the 
recipient.  For example, if a person points to a bicycle, it is, without context, unclear 
to what that person is referring.  The pointing gesture could refer to the bicycle as 
whole, its colour, its type or to only its tires.  Without context, it would also be 
unclear as to why that person is pointing to the bike.  It could be because she wants to 
steal it, because she had the same type of bike before, or perhaps to indicate that her 
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friend, who owns that very bicycle, is somewhere nearby.  In contrast, if it is mutually 
known between the communicator and the recipient that that very bike was recently 
stolen from the communicator, then the recipient would have no trouble interpreting 
the gesture.  Thus, pointing involves three aspects: common ground (shared 
knowledge), a referential intention (to what the pointer is actually referring) and a 
social intention (the motive, or reason that someone is pointing).  There are various 
social intentions underlying people’s points, for example to share interest in objects, 
or to request objects.  The focus of this thesis, however, is on informative pointing 
where one points with the underlying social intention to let the other person know 
something.   
 
1.6.  Infant studies using pointing 
When interacting with another, infants keep track of what the person knows or does 
not yet know based on the information that was shared between them during 
contextualized episodes of joint-attentional engagement.  This tracking of information 
is reflected in how infants comprehend others’ verbal requests (Saylor et al., 2007; 
Moll et al., 2008; Grosse et al., 2010), how they comprehend others’ pointing gestures 
(Liebal, Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2009), as well as in their own production of 
pointing gestures (Liszkowski, et al., 2007; O’Neill, 1996).  For example, in a recent 
study, Liebal, Carpenter & Tomasello (2010) showed that 18-month-old infants use 
shared experience to make communicative decisions.  Infants in this study played with 
two different adults with one set of toys each (ducks and bears).  Infants were then 
shown two photographs depicting a duck and a bear in the presence of one of the two 
adults.  Infants selectively choose to point and communicate about the specific toy 
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with which they had prior mutual experience playing with as opposed to the other toy 
which was played with by the other adult.  
Importantly, a number of interactive studies using pointing show that infants 
from their first year onwards tailor their communicative acts to what others do or do 
not know (Saylor and Ganea, 2007; Moll, Richter, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2008; 
Grosse, Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2010; Liebal, Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello, 
2009; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007; O’Neill, 1996).  Such studies also 
show that infants are motivated to help others by providing them with relevant 
information.   For example, by 12-months, infants use the pointing gesture selectively 
to help an adult find a sought-after object (Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2008).  In this study, infants informed an adult about an object’s location, depending 
on whether or not the adult had seen the object disappearing.  Infants only pointed to 
the object when the adult did not see the object disappearing (and was therefore 
ignorant about the object’s actual location).   
Recent work by Southgate, Chevallier and Csibra (2010) and Buttelmann, Carpenter, 
and Tomasello (2009) suggests that 18-month-old infants also respond appropriately 
to an adult who held a false belief about the location of a toy.  In the study by 
Southgate et al. (2010), infants were familiarized with searching for one of two toys in 
two different boxes. The toys were swapped in either the adult’s presence or in the 
adult’s absence and, upon return, the adult pointed at one box and verbally requested 
the toy.  Results revealed that, when the adult had witnessed the swap, infants 
consistently selected the toy contained in the box to which the adult had pointed.  
However, when the adult had not witnessed the swap, infants chose the toy in the 
other box.  In a similar design, Buttelmann et al. (2009) showed that 18-month-old 
infants responded differently to an adult depending on whether he had or had not 
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witnessed a toy’s swap.  After playing briefly with the infant, an adult introduced a 
novel toy and put it in one of two boxes.  The toy was then moved to another box, in 
either the presence or absence of the adult.  Subsequently, the adult went to the -  
now-empty - box and tried but failed to open it.  In response to the adult’s failure, 
infants opened the - now-empty - box when the adult had witnessed the transfer, but 
opened the other box when the adult had not witnessed the transfer.  Only when the 
adult had not witnessed the transfer, did infants interpret the adult’s action as being 
based on a false belief.   
Taken together, previous research demonstrates that infants in their second 
year help others appropriately by taking into account what others know or do not 
know when responding to their actions.  Two recent studies (Southgate et al., 2010 
and Buttelmann et al., 2009) even suggest that 18-month-old infants also respond 
appropriately to an adult who held a false belief.  However, one crucial aspect has not 
been addressed in previous research. That is,  the prediction of others’ actions based 
on their beliefs. The prediction of others’ actions in belief contexts is considered 
important evidence of belief ascription (Dennett, 1978).  However, in all of the 
looking time studies (see above) and interactive studies (Southgate et al., 2010; 
Buttelmann et al., 2009; Liszkowski et al., 2007, 2008) on infants’ mental state 
understanding, infants were not required to predict an adult’s mistaken action.  
Instead, infants were required to respond after a mistake was already made, for 
example, a mistaken request (Southgate et al., 2010), or a failed attempt to open a box 
(Buttelmann et al., 2009).  Generating a response to a mistaken request or a failed 
attempt, however, is said to be easier for infants than predicting and anticipating a 
mistaken action.  In the former case, infants are confronted with a situation where the 
adult's goal and belief is explicitly presented to the infant, for instance, when trying to 
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open a box in Buttelmann et al.’s study, whereas in the latter case, infants need to 
predict and anticipate the adult’s goals and beliefs.  That is to say, when responding to 
someone’s action mistake, infants are required to reason from this particular action 
mistake to goals and beliefs (backward reasoning).  In contrast, when predicting 
someone’s action mistake, infants are required to reason from goals and beliefs to 
actions (forward reasoning).  Previous verbal false belief studies indeed suggest that 
predicting action mistakes is more demanding than explaining action mistakes 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; MacLaren & Olson, 1993; Ruffman & Keenan, 1996).  
For example, in Bartsch & Wellman’s (1989) deceptive container task, 3-year-old 
children were shown that Band-Aids were not actually in the Band-Aid box, but 
instead, in another similar box.  Children were then introduced to a puppet who 
wanted a Band-Aid.  In the prediction condition, children were asked to predict where 
the puppet would search.  In the explanation condition, children first witnessed the 
puppet searching in the Band-Aid box, after which they were asked to explain why the 
puppet had searched in that particular box.  Results revealed that only 25% of the 
children succeeded at predicting the mistaken action, whereas 71% succeeded at 
explaining the mistaken action.   
To date, only one study (Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007) has shown the 
prediction of adults’ mistaken actions by infants.  However, this study used 
anticipatory eye-tracking methods as opposed to an interactive setting and, thus, did 
not measure infants’ ability to use this knowledge when interacting with others.  
Furthermore, the only two studies that did investigate how infants use their knowledge 
about others’ mental states (Southgate et al., 2010 and Buttelman et al., 2009) did not 
require infants to predict others’ actions. Therefore, to date, it remains unclear 
whether infants can actively predict and anticipate others’ belief-based actions in 
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contextualized interactions. Furthermore, it is also important to consider the fact that 
infants in Southgate et al. (2010) and Buttelmann, et al. (2009) were trained 
beforehand on the behaviour that was being  tested. Specifically, in Southgate et al. 
(2010), infants were only tested if they succeeded in choosing the correct toy that the 
adult requested twice in a row from each of the two boxes. Infants who did not 
succeed in the training phase were either excluded from testing (Southgate et al., 
2010) or prompted to respond to another experimenter (Buttelmann et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the results of these studies are based on a selected group of infants who 
were taught, beforehand, how to respond in the test phase.  Admittedly, this does not 
necessarily affect the observed differences between conditions, however, it also does 
not test the spontaneous usage of infants’ mindreading abilities.  
The current thesis attempts to deal with the shortcomings of previous research 
discussed above and investigates whether infants in their second year predict and 
anticipate others’ belief-based actions and spontaneously communicate relevant 
information through pointing.  In each of the three studies compiling this thesis, 
infants were required to anticipate the experimenter’s actions.  That is, the frequency 
of infants’ pointing gestures was measured in the period before the adult acted in 
accordance with her belief.  In addition, infants were never trained to point for the 
adult, nor were they familiarized with the procedure.  Infants’ responses were thus 
completely spontaneous and based on their situated understanding of the events.  
 
1.7.  Outline of the thesis 
The next three chapters report on interactive studies examining infants’ ability to use 
their sensitivity to others’ belief-based actions.  All three studies used pointing as a 
measure of infants’ communicative responses.  Chapter 2 reports on a study that 
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investigated whether 18- and 24-month-old infants correct an adult who is mistaken 
about the location of an object in anticipation of her searching in the wrong location.  
The study presented in Chapter 3 asked whether 12- and 18-month-old infants inform 
an adult about the reappearance of an aversive object in anticipation of her 
encountering it again.  Chapter 4 reports on a study that combined aspects of the 
studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3.  This study investigated whether 18-month-old 
infants inform an adult differently about two contaminated locations depending on her 
holding a false belief or her being ignorant about the location of her toy.   Finally, 
Chapter 5 summarizes the three studies and integrates their findings into the literature 
discussed in the first chapter.  I conclude by situating the current findings into recent 
theoretical proposals offered by both psychologists and philosophers.  
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CHAPTER 2 
   
18- and 24-month-old infants correct others in anticipation  
of action mistakes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
Knudsen, B. & Liszkowski, U. (2012). 18- and 24-month-old infants correct others in 
anticipation of action mistakes. Developmental Science, 15(1), 113-123.  
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Abstract 
Much of human communication and collaboration is predicated on making predictions 
about others' actions.  Humans frequently use predictions about others' action 
mistakes to correct others and spare them mistakes.  Such anticipatory correcting 
reveals a social motivation for unsolicited helping.  Cognitively, it requires forward 
inferences about others' actions through mental attributions of goal and reality 
representations.  The current study shows that infants spontaneously intervene when 
an adult is mistaken about the location of an object she is about to retrieve.  Infants 
pointed out a correct location for an adult before she was about to commit a mistake.  
Infants did not intervene in control conditions when the adult had witnessed the 
misplacement, or when she did not intend to retrieve the misplaced object.  Results 
suggest that preverbal infants anticipate a person's mistaken action through mental 
attributions of both her goal and reality representations, and correct her proactively by 
spontaneously providing unsolicited information.   
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2.1. Introduction 
 Much of human communication and collaboration is predicated on making 
predictions about others' actions.  Predicting others' actions enables one to interact 
rapidly and in accordance with others' actions before these are executed.  Many 
animals exploit others' actions for their own benefit, as it were with Machiavellian-
like intelligence (Byrne & Whiten 1988; Hare & Tomasello, 2004).  However, 
humans use their action predictions also to help others avoid mistakes and mishaps.  
For example, if you see your friend parking her car in the parking fee zone in front of 
your house you may anticipate her going to the parking meter and buy a ticket.  
However, if you know that the parking meter broke that very morning, you might 
spontaneously help her and indicate another parking meter to spare her walking to the 
broken one and loosing money.  The current paper investigates the ontogenetic roots 
of what we call 'anticipatory correcting' and asks when children begin to intervene 
helpfully and correct a person in anticipation of her acting mistakenly, that is, before 
she initiates an action that will lead to a mistake or mishap. 
 Predicting others' actions is based on 'theory-of-mind' skills (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978) which are most evident in the case of predicting others' action 
mistakes (Dennett, 1978).  Cognitively, the prediction of action mistakes requires both 
an understanding of a person's goal prior to her acting ('prior intentions', Searle, 1983; 
e.g., getting a parking ticket); and an understanding of her incorrect representation of 
reality that will lead her to act mistakenly (e.g., going to a broken park meter).  Both 
of these mental attributions are necessary and neither of them alone is sufficient to 
predict a mistaken action.  In addition, predicting a goal-oriented action before it is 
initiated is based on some form of 'forward' inferences from the actor's mental 
representations to her action goal.  This is different from the case of observing and 
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making sense of completed, or ongoing goal-oriented actions, which is based on 
'backward' inferences from the observed goal-oriented action to the actor's mental 
representations (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1989).   
 Most infant studies have investigated social-cognitive attributions of goal and 
reality representations separately (for studies with verbal children, see also Leslie, 
German & Polizzi, 2005).  For example, infants around their first birthdays interpret a 
completed action in terms of its goal, as revealed by habituation studies (Woodward, 
1998; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra & Biro, 1995) and imitation studies (Carpenter, 
Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998).  But infants also infer the unseen goal of an ongoing 
action.  For example, in action-based imitation studies infants reproduce the unseen 
goal of a failed action attempt at 18 (Meltzoff, 1995) and 12 months of age (Nielsen, 
2006).  Further, a recent looking-time study shows that 12-month-olds will look 
longer at a single chasing event of two balls when it does not result in a catch than 
when it does (Southgate & Csibra, 2009).  In other designs using multiple exposures 
to a goal-directed action, an eye-tracking study shows that 12-month-olds will look 
ahead of time to a bucket to which a human hand is transferring an object, but not 
when the object moves self-propelled (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck & von Hofsten, 2006).  
And an EEG study of sensorimotor activation reveals that 9-month-olds are sensitive 
to others' goals during the online observation of a goal-directed grasping action 
(Southgate, Johnson, El Karoui & Csibra, 2010).   
 Around 12 months of age infants thus infer a goal when watching an ongoing 
action that is directed towards an occluded or unreached goal.  Presumably, infants 
infer the unseen goal of an ongoing, goal-oriented action through backward reasoning 
from the ongoing action to the actor's goal representation (Gloss: "What is she doing? 
She must be trying XYZ").  It is less clear to what extent infants also make 'forward' 
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predictions from an actor's goal representation to her action before it is directed 
towards a discernable goal.  To do so, infants must know something about another's 
goal prior to the goal-directed action.  An imitation study shows that 2-year-old 
children indeed consider others' prior intentions when observing an ongoing action 
demonstration.  In the study, 2-year-olds understood the goal of an ongoing action 
demonstration in terms of what the demonstrator had done or intended to do before 
she demonstrated the to-be-copied action (Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2002; see 
also Southgate et al., 2009).  Though based on backward predictions, the study shows 
that at least by 2 years of age children are sensitive to others' prior intentions, a 
necessary prerequisite for anticipatory correcting. 
 However, to predict that a person will act erroneously one also needs to 
consider the person's epistemic representation of reality.  Recent looking-time studies 
suggest that infants in their second year of life are sensitive to another's epistemic 
relation to the world when interpreting her ongoing action.  Infants will look longer at 
psychologically implausible events, for example when an actor reaches for an object 
in one of two locations that is incongruent with her last information about the object's 
location, whether she obtained the information through visual observation (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007), communication, (Song, Onishi, 
Baillargeon & Fisher, 2008) or manual exploration (Träuble, Marinović & Pauen, 
2010; for a recent overview see Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010).  Since violation-of-
expectation studies require recognition of "after-the-fact incongruent events" (Keen, 
2003, cited in Southgate et al. 2007) and are presumably based on backward 
inferences, Southgate et al. (2007) investigated anticipatory gaze shifts to test whether 
children also make forward predictions about an actor's action based on her 
representations of reality.  In their eye-tracking study 25-month-old children were first 
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trained with a discriminative cue to make a gaze shift to one of two doors (the doors 
lit up and a sound occurred) through which an actor subsequently reached to retrieved 
an object from a box in front of it.  61% of the 2-year-olds succeeded in making 
prospective gaze shifts at training and test.  At test, after the discriminative cue, a 
significant majority of these children looked at the door through which the actor was 
about to reach for the object where she had last seen it - even when the object had 
been moved to the alternative box and was then removed altogether from the scene.  
The study thus shows that 2-year-olds engage in 'forward' reasoning from epistemic 
states to actions that have not yet been executed.  With regard to anticipatory 
correcting, current research thus suggests that at least each of the two cognitive 
prerequisites, that is forward inferences about others' actions from goal 
representations and reality representations are present around 2 years of age.   
 Another question, however, is whether infants are able and motivated to use 
their forward action prediction skills productively to help others avoid prospective 
mistakes.  Previous research has suggested that children use the cognitive skills 
productively in guiding their own actions only around age 4 when they begin to lie to 
others (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2008) and become sensitive to misinformation (Sperber et 
al., 2010).  When lying, one has to consider a person's prior goal and then induce an 
incorrect representation of reality, in anticipation of this incorrect representation 
leading the person to pursue her goal incorrectly and thus act mistakenly.  But since 
human communication is truthful and cooperative by default and lying is the 
exception, it is entirely possible that before higher-order deceptive and competitive 
motives emerge, children make and use predictions of action mistakes to help others 
in collaborative interactions.   
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 Recent studies reveal that infants are indeed motivated to help an adult who 
encounters a problem.  For example, in the second year, infants will empathically help 
an adult who expresses sorrow over the loss of a toy (e.g., a broken teddy) by 
compensating the loss with a duplicate toy (Bischof-Köhler, 1991).  And 18-month-
olds will instrumentally help an adult who expresses dissatisfaction and struggles in 
attaining a goal by assisting in her task (e.g., open a door or box; Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2006).  Further, 18-month-olds also seem to tailor their instrumental 
helping to the adult's epistemic relation to his goal.  In a recent study (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter & Tomasello, 2009), infants were first trained how to open a box.  At test, 
64% of the 18-month-old infants who did not fuss then helped an adult who tried 
effortfully to open one of two boxes.  In one condition, the adult had not witnessed 
that a toy had been swapped from one to the other box.  In that condition, the children 
who helped in reaction to the adult's difficulty mostly opened the other box to retrieve 
the toy.  The spontaneous helping response was moderately pronounced in that study, 
given that the behavior had been practiced just before.  However, the cognitive 
interpretation that those infants who helped did so by considering the adult's 
representation of reality has recently been corroborated in a similar study (Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010).  In that study, 17-month-olds had to comply with an 
adult's request to retrieve one of two objects that were each in a box.  First, infants 
practiced to retrieve a toy from a box when the experimenter requested it.  At test, 
when the adult had not witnessed a swap of the objects and now requested an object 
by pointing to a box, the significant majority of infants retrieved the object from the 
other box.  Although the study did not involve prosocial helping but compliance with 
a request, it supports the cognitive interpretation of previous looking time studies and 
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suggests that infants interpret and react appropriately to an adult's mistaken action by 
reference to her representation of reality.   
 However, anticipatory correcting is based on the usage of forward predictions 
and a motivation to help others spontaneously, that is, before help is solicited.  One 
troubling aspect of the previous helping studies is that infants always reacted after a 
problem or mishap had occurred.  Thus, it is possible that infants reacted either to the 
adult's request for help (possibly as part of general compliance, e.g., Kärtner, Keller & 
Chaudhary, 2010), or directly to remedy the aversive situation (e.g., Preston & de 
Waal, 2002).  However, anticipatory correcting as illustrated in our example requires 
intervening before any problem has yet occurred.  It is possible that this kind of 
proactive helping is especially common in communicative acts, for example when 
warning others (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2010), or informing them about changes that 
are relevant to future behaviors.  Recent studies have shown that 12-month-olds 
indeed help an adult who searches for an object by informing her through 
communicative pointing (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano & Tomasello, 2006), more 
so when the adult has not seen the object than when she has (Liszkowski, Carpenter & 
Tomasello, 2008).  However, in these studies, too, the adult was explicitly searching 
for an object and expressing some kind of puzzlement and frustration, so that it is 
entirely possible that infants simply complied with the request for information, or in 
an effort to remedy the problem.  It is less clear whether infants would spontaneously 
help an adult who is not yet in problems by communicating to him relevant 
information.  Such kind of intervening would not only constitute evidence for a 
spontaneous behavioral usage of forward action predictions.  It would also 
corroborate theories of altruism in infancy (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). 
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 In the current study we investigated whether 18- and 24-month-old infants 
would correct an adult communicatively with a non-verbal pointing gesture when she 
was about to commit an action mistake.  In particular we were interested whether such 
anticipatory correcting would occur fully spontaneously and be based on an 
integration of both the adult's goal representation and her representation of reality.  
We designed an interactive paradigm and manipulated independently both these 
factors.  To manipulate the adult's prior intention, infants first watched an adult either 
enact her intention to find an object in a set of containers (correct action condition; 
mistaken action condition) or clean these containers (different action condition).  In 
both cases she found an object and then left the scene.  To manipulate the adult's 
representation of reality, a second experimenter subsequently changed the location of 
the object either in the absence (mistaken action condition; different action condition) 
or presence (correct action condition) of the adult.  At test, the adult re-entered 
without discerning which container she would approach.   
 Based on the reviewed research we expected that infants would be motivated 
to help and intervene spontaneously to correct the adult before she would act 
mistakenly or display any signs of discomfort or problems.  We expected that infants 
would intervene selectively by integrating both her goal representation and her 
representation of reality.  We thus predicted that infants would point to the object’s 
new location only when the adult intended to retrieve the object but had an incorrect 
representation of its location (mistaken action condition).  In contrast, infants should 
not point to the object’s new location in the different action condition, when the adult 
had an incorrect representation of the object's location but pursued a different goal.  
And infants should not point to the object’s new location in the correct action 
condition, when the adult had a correct representation of the object's location and 
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intended to retrieve it.  Since we were interested in infants' truly spontaneous, action-
based usage of action predictions, we did not administer any pre-training on pointing, 
informing, helping, or any other additional inclusion criteria.  In addition, since we 
wanted to investigate 'forward' action predictions we were careful to test infants' 
behavior while the adult's action was still ambiguous, that is before it was apparent in 
the adult's orienting and reaching behavior on which container she would act. 
2.2. Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight 18-month-olds (24 girls, 24 boys; M=18;10, range=17;28-18;27) 
and 16 24-month-olds (8 girls, 8 boys; M=24;14, range=24;9-24;28) participated in 
the study. Infants were recruited from a database of parents who volunteered to 
participate in infancy research. Seven 18-month-olds and six 24-month-olds were 
excluded because of fussiness (10), experimenter error (2), or parental interference 
(1).   
Set-up & Materials  
 The testing room measured 4.60x4.60m (see Figure 1). Eighty centimetres to 
the side of the table a room-divider partitioned off 1m of the room. Two cameras 
recorded the infant and two cameras recorded the experimenter.  Two sets of four 
identical opaque containers were used. They were equally spaced across the table on 
E1's side, approximately 70 cm away from the infant. For the 24-month-olds an 
additional two sets of containers were used. One novel object was used in each trial.  
For the 18-month-olds these were (i) a white plastic lid with yellow tape and (ii) a 
piece of a sponge.  For the 24-month-olds, two additional objects were (iii) an O-
shaped and a (iv) trapeze-shaped curtain holder.  
Procedure 
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 Infants sat on their parents' lap at a table facing the experimenter (E1).  A 
second experimenter (E2) hid behind the room-divider.  Parents were instructed to 
remain silent and not to interfere.  The 18-month-olds were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions.  Each condition consisted of 2 trials which were separated by brief 
play.  Each trial consisted of three phases.  Each trial began with E1 lining up the four 
containers of a set on her side of the table. The order of container sets was 
counterbalanced across participants.  Either the far left or the far right container 
contained one of the novel objects.  The order alternated and was fully 
counterbalanced.   
 Context-phase: In the mistaken action and correct action conditions, E1 
searched for the object. She opened the first container, showed it to the infant and said 
with mild disappointment: "No, it's not in here. Hmm, where could it be?"  She 
proceeded in the exact same manner with the other containers.  When she found the 
object in the last container, she said excitedly: "Hey! Here it is! That's neat!"  In the 
different action condition, instead of searching, E1 cleaned the containers and then 
attached a sticker.  She opened the first container, showed it to the infant and said: " I 
clean it." She wiped out the container and said "Look, what I do" and she marked the 
container with a small sticker to signal that she was done.  When she found the object 
in the last container she acted surprised and said: "Hey! There's an object! That's a 
surprise!"  In all three conditions, E1 then held up the object, pretending somebody 
had knocked at the door, and said that she had to leave quickly.  She put the object 
back into the container making sure infants watched, stood up, tapped on the container 
and said she would be right back to continue. 
 Switch-phase:  E2 appeared from behind the room-divider in a slightly 
conspicuous manner, greeted the infant and took the object out of the container, held 
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it up and said "Oh, look". She alternated gaze between the door and the infant and 
said "Look! I'm putting it in here". She put the object inside the container on the 
opposite side, alternated gaze between the door and the infant, showed the object 
again and placed it back into the new container.  Then she hid again behind the room-
divider and E1 re-entered the room.  In the correct action condition E1 re-entered the 
room earlier, stood at the door, and E1 and E2 greeted each other in a friendly manner 
saying “hello”. When E2 retrieved the toy she also called E1 and said "[E1's name], 
look!". When E2 put the object into the new container she also said to E1 "Look [E1's 
name], I'm putting it in here."  E1made two steps towards the table to demonstrate that 
she witnessed where the toy was going, and said "Ah, ok!" alternating gaze between 
the new container and the infant. Then, E1 stepped back again to close the door and 
waited there to begin the test phase.  E1 and E2 said goodbye to each other and E2 hid 
behind the room divider. 
 Test:  The test phase took about 30 seconds and began with E1 standing at the 
door.  In a predetermined and timed sequence she first said: "Good. Shall we continue 
playing?" and then approached the table steadily on an L-shaped path, walking 
confidently but never discerning which box she would approach, stopping twice on 
two predefined spots (see Figure 1).  She first walked about 2 meters in parallel to the 
table, stopped briefly, looked at the infant and said "Okay, let's go on", and then 
turned to approach the table perpendicularly for another two meters, stopped again, 
looked at the infant and said again "Okay, let's go on." The test phase ended as soon 
as E1 had sat down and before she lifted her arms to reach for one of the containers.  
If the infant pointed during this period, E1 looked at the infant and said "Yes", but 
continued her predetermined and timed sequence. Only data obtained during this 
anticipation period were analyzed. Trials ended with E1 acting on the container 
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congruent with her goal and reality representation by either putting a sticker on the 
empty container (different action condition), or retrieving the toy (correct action 
condition).  In the mistaken action condition, if infants had not pointed, E1 first 
reached for and opened the now-empty box, showed it to the infant and said "Huh? 
How is this possible? It is empty!" (Search phase 1). If infants did not point, E1 
continued "Where is the toy? [name infant], do you know where the toy is?" (Search 
phase 2).  If infants had not pointed, E1 always found the object in the course of 
putting away the containers and said "Ah, look! Here it was!" 
 The 24-month-olds were tested after completion of the study with the 18-
month-olds in an attempt to test for an increase in performance in the mistaken action 
condition and to replicate findings in a within-subject design. Since we expected 
infants would become restless after 4 trials, we administered only the mistaken action 
and correct action conditions with order fully counterbalanced. 
Coding and reliability  
 Index-finger pointing was coded by the first author if it occurred during the 
test phase with the arm and index-finger either fully or half extended towards the 
current or previous locations of the object, or the room-divider.  None of the points 
were addressed to the mothers who sat still behind their infants.  A second coder who 
was naive to the hypotheses of the study recoded infants' number of points in each of 
the two test phases of 28% of the infants in each condition.  Inter-rater reliability was 
excellent, Cohen's Kappa=.92 for the 18-month-olds and Cohen's Kappa=.88 for the 
24-month-olds.  A manipulation check on the test phase was conducted by a third 
coder who was unaware about the purpose of the study.  Videos of 15 18-month-olds 
and 5 24-month-olds were randomly selected and cut to the test phases.  The coder 
judged in a two-alternative forced choice task whether E1 would approach the left or 
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right container.  For both age groups the coder was at chance in predicting the 
container (18-months-olds, binomial test, p=.362; 24-months-olds, binomial test, 
p=.824) with no significant differences between conditions (at each age respectively, 
χ² (n=30) =.659; χ² (n=20) =.370). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Schematic depiction of the set-up and procedure. a): Context-phase. E1 either searches for 
an object which she finds in the last container (mistaken action and correct action conditions) or cleans 
the containers and accidentally finds the object in the last container (different action condition). E2 is 
hiding behind a room divider. b): Switch-phase. E2 places the object into the container on the opposite 
side, either unbeknownst to E1 (mistaken action and different action conditions) or while E1 is 
watching (correct action condition; not depicted here). c): Test. E1 enters the room and walks in a 
predefined L-shaped path, first in parallel to the table (2m), then slowly approaching the table (2m). 
 
2.3. Results 
 The left panel of Figure 2 shows significant differences in the mean number of 
points across conditions, F(2,45)=5.44, p=.008.  Following our predictions, planned 
LSD post-hoc tests (one-tailed, based on the pooled standard deviation of the 
ANOVA) revealed that 18-month-olds pointed significantly more to the object's new 
location in the mistaken action condition compared to the correct action or different 
action conditions, respectively, mean difference=.531, p=.005, Cohen's d=.782 and 
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mean difference=.594, p=.002, Cohen's d=.9391
 Additional analyses revealed little pointing to the object's previous location 
(mistaken action condition, M=.156, SD=.507; correct action condition, M=.000; 
different action condition, M=.094, SD=.272) or the second adult's hiding place 
(mistaken action and correct action condition, M=.031, SD=.125; different action 
condition, M=.344, SD=.889), and no systematic differences between the conditions, 
thus further excluding alternative possibilities of what infants were doing when 
pointing.  Finally, in the mistaken action condition, after E1 had reached for and 
opened the now-empty box, three additional infants pointed to the other (target) box 
(totalling 62.5% of all infants; two pointed in the first trial of search phase 1; one in 
the second trial of search phase 2). 
.  The left panel of Figure 3 shows 
that on the individual level significantly more 18-month-olds pointed at least once to 
the new object's location in the mistaken action (7/16) than correct action (1/16) or 
different action (1/16) conditions (Fisher's Exact tests, both p's=.019).  There were no 
significant differences between first and second trial performance, not with regard to 
the mean number of points (Wilcoxon, p=.931) nor with regard to the number of 
infants who pointed (McNemar, p=1).  Although there were no differences across the 
two trials, when looking at the first trial only, the pattern of individual performance 
remained similar.  It approached significance between the mistaken action and correct 
action conditions (Fisher's Exact tests, p=.086), and was significant between the 
mistaken action and different action conditions (Fisher's Exact tests, p=.022). 
                                                 
1 A 2x2 ANOVA with Condition as between-subjects factor and Location (old vs. new) as within-
subjects factor revealed a significant interaction effect between Condition and Location, 
F(2,45)=3.198, p = .025. Infants pointed more to the new location than to the old location in the 
mistaken action condition (t(15) =-1.959, p=.035), but not in the correct action or different action 
condition (both, t(15)=-1, p=.33). An ANOVA comparing pointing towards the old location between 
conditions revealed no significant differences, F(2,45)=.896, p =.415. 
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 At 24 months, more than half of the infants exhibited the target behavior in the 
mistaken action condition.  Results were replicated in a within-subject design, see 
right panels of Figures 2 and 3, for both number of points (t(15) =3.72, p=.001, 
Cohen's d=.794) and number of infants (McNemar, p=.035).  Further, in the mistaken 
action condition, after E1 had reached for and opened the now-empty box, two 
additional infants pointed to the other (target) box (totalling 81% of all infants; both 
pointed in search phase 1). 
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Figure 2.  Mean number of points per trial to the target container.  18-month-olds were tested in a 
between-subject design (left panel), 24-month-olds in a within-subject design (right panel).  Stars 
indicate significant differences. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of infants who pointed at least once.  18-month-olds were tested in a between-
subject design (left panel), 24-month-olds in a within-subject design (right panel).  Stars indicate 
significant differences. 
 
2.4. Discussion 
 Infants used a non-verbal pointing gesture to correct an adult who was about to 
- but had not yet started to - act mistakenly and retrieve an object from a wrong 
location.  Infants corrected the adult selectively depending on the adult's prior goal 
representation and her representation of reality.  Such form of anticipatory correcting 
reveals an early manifestation of an unsolicited and spontaneous, behavioral usage of 
forward action predictions.  The fact that infants helped even before an aversive 
situation, problem or request for help had occurred underscores infants' prosocial 
concern for others. 
 Infants pointed selectively in the mistaken action condition, when the adult 
had the goal of retrieving the object but an incorrect representation about its location.  
Importantly, infants provided the new information only when it was relevant to the 
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combination of both the adult's prior goal representation and her representation of 
reality.  When either of these factors was altered separately, for example when the 
adult had not witnessed the location change but intended to continue cleaning the 
container (different action condition), or when the adult intended to retrieve the object 
and had already witnessed the location change (correct action condition), infants did 
not point for the adult.  Thus, infants integrated both goal and reality representations 
in generating predictions about the adult's next action.  The integration of these two 
directions-of-fit (Searle, 1983) is a core aspect in the emergence of desire-belief 
psychology and theory of mind (e.g., Wellman, 1990).   
 At the same time the pattern of results excludes several alternative possibilities 
of what infants were doing when pointing.  For example, if infants always pointed out 
for the adult what's new (e.g., Liszkowski, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2007) or what she 
had not witnessed (O'Neill, 1996), they should have pointed in both of the conditions 
in which the adult did not witness the location change.  And they should have pointed 
to the second adult's hiding place when the adult had not seen her.  Alternatively, if 
infants always wanted to comment on or request the next step in an action sequence, 
infants should have pointed to the object's new location irrespective of whether the 
adult had or had not witnessed the location change.  Further, in the different action 
condition they should have pointed to the unmarked container where the action should 
continue.  Finally, if infants pointed only egocentrically, they should have pointed in 
all three conditions equally, for example to request the object for themselves, or for 
other, non-communicative reasons.  Instead, infants pointed only in the mistaken 
action condition, which is in accordance with the interpretation that infants corrected 
the adult in anticipation of her committing a mistake. 
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 Infants pointed spontaneously and unsolicited, without prior training, before 
an action mistake of another person had happened.  Previous looking-time studies 
have revealed infants' understanding of actions by measuring spontaneous increase of 
visual attention in response to erroneous actions (see Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010), 
or by measuring anticipatory looking in cued choices about an expected action (at two 
years of age; Southgate et al., 2007).  These studies reveal infants' information 
processing capacities (respectively, backward and forward inferences about others' 
mistaken actions).  However, they did not address infants' behavioral usage of these 
cognitive skills.  It is important to note that in the current study we neither excluded 
participants who did not show the target behavior, nor did we train participants to 
produce the target behavior, as has been the case in previous studies.  For example, in 
the Buttelmann et al. (2009) study, the percentage of 18-month-olds who helped 
freely (64%) may be more comparable to our 24- than 18-month-olds.  However, in 
that study (Buttelmann et al., 2009; see also Southgate et al., 2010), participants also 
received prior training on the target behavior.  In the current study infants were not 
trained to point for the adult.  It is possible that familiarizing infants with a searching 
and questioning adult beforehand, and engaging them in pointing activities, would 
have increased infants' pointing at test.  However, this would have precluded 
measuring spontaneous behavior. 
 Another difference lies in the directionality of the predictions infants had to 
make in order to tailor their actions accordingly.  In the previous action-based studies 
(Buttelmann et al., 2009; Southgate et al., 2010; Carpenter et al., 2002) infants 
presumably had to go through an inference of the kind 'she is doing X because she 
intends/believes Y'.  In the current study, to correct someone in anticipation of an 
action mistake, infants presumably had to make an inference in the opposite direction: 
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'she intends/believes X and so will do Y'.  For older, verbal children it has been 
suggested that the latter kind of 'forward reasoning' from others' goals and beliefs to 
their actions apparently emerges after 'backward reasoning' from others' actions to 
their goals and beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Robinson & Mitchell, 1995).  
When including infants' performance in the current study after the anticipation phase, 
that is when the adult was already acting mistakenly or expressing problems, target 
performance increased to 62.5% at 18 months (comparable to Buttelmann et al., 
2009), and 81% at 24 months.   
 Beginning around 18 months of age (as conventionally indicated by the 
median age of emergence; e.g., Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998), and 
developing throughout the second year, infants use forward inferences about a 
person's next action to spontaneously guide their own, uncued and unsolicited actions.  
Although results of the first trial only approached significance for one comparison for 
the 18-month-olds, it is more likely that this reflects reduced statistical power than 
that infants performance was based on procedural feedback of the first trial.  First, 
there were no statistical differences in infants' performance between the two trials.  
Second, if anything, infants might have learned that the adult retrieved the object in 
the mistaken action condition anyway, which should have let them to point less in the 
second trial.  The considerably large effect sizes and the within-subject replication at 
24 months of age confirm the reliable and selective occurrence of the target behavior.  
The results suggest an increase in infants' anticipatory correcting over the second half 
of the second year of life, which is corroborated by Southgate et al.'s (2007) finding of 
predictive 'theory-of-mind' processing at 25 months of age.  The developmental 
increase may reflect infants' increasing communicative competencies and experiences 
over the second year of life.  Post-hoc inspections of the video recordings further 
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revealed that some 24-month-olds (63%) also verbalized about the new object's 
location.  The number of verbalizations about the target container, for example "Look 
here" or "In there", were more frequent in the mistaken action condition (72%) than in 
the correct action condition (28%), thus further supporting the interpretation that 
infants were communicating to the adult about the correct location of the object to 
spare her a mistake. 
 Recent research has revitalized the question whether chimpanzees (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008) and infants (Baillargeon et al., 2010) have a theory of mind.  While 
traditional accounts accept convincing evidence for a representational theory of mind 
only from explicit, usually verbal false belief tasks (Perner, 1991; Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2004), other researchers have criticized the additional tasks demands and 
suggested to abandon the classic false belief task (Bloom & German, 2000; Roth & 
Leslie, 1998; Birch & Bloom, 2007).  New implicit, looking-based tasks do not entail 
these additional demands like language and choice anymore, but researchers have 
usually maintained an interpretation in terms of 'false belief'.  This interpretation has 
not remained uncontested.  For example, some researchers have suggested two 
different theory-of-mind systems (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), possibly operating on 
implicit versus explicit, or automatic versus conscious levels, the former being present 
in infancy, the latter developing well beyond the preschool period.  Other alternatives 
to 'false belief'-based interpretations are that children expect a person to look for her 
object where she last saw or touched it (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 2005), or attribute a 
lack of, rather than an incorrect representation of reality (e.g., Southgate et al., 2007; 
Wellmann, 2010).  Most infancy studies to date acknowledge the possibility of an 
alternative interpretation of their data in terms of behavioral rules or ignorance (e.g., 
Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, p.257; Baillargeon, 2010, p.33; Surian et al., 2007, 
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p.583; Southgate et al., 2007, p.590; Soutgate et al., 2010, p.911; Buttelmann, 2009, 
p.341; Träuble, 2010, p.436), which suggests that the precise cognitive mechanisms of 
'theory-of-mind' in infancy are not yet fully understood.   
 The current study investigated whether infants spontaneously use respective 
skills in guiding their own, unsolicited acting.  We cannot rule out that infants' 
communicative actions were based on a general expectation that a person goes where 
she last saw an object, a general alternative interpretation for all change-of-location 
tasks.  It is also at least possible that infants expected the person to do a mistake by 
attributing to her a lack of a representation, rather than an incorrect representation of 
reality.  The latter account holds that children assume when a person doesn't know 
where an object is she will always err instead of getting it sometimes right by chance.  
However, studies pitting chance against error do not support this proposal in adults 
and children (Friedman & Petrashek, 2009) and in 18-month-olds (Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2009).  Further, other studies have shown that infants keep track over 
time of what other people know (Moll, Richter, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2008; Saylor, 
& Ganea, 2007).  It is reasonable to assume that infants kept track of what the adult 
knew also in the mistaken action condition and thus expected her to search in the 
container in which she had last seen the object.  It is also important to note that the 
adult did not express any uncertainty or other signs of ignorance or search behavior as 
in previous studies (Liszkowski et al., 2006; 2008). 
 The current study neither tested infants' (visual) social-cognitive processing, 
nor children's (verbal) elaborations and theorizing about others' actions.  Instead, it 
advanced a usage-based approach.  Infants could freely choose to act or not in 
accordance with another's to-be-expected action, while the criteria for the kind of 
required forward action prediction were those typically used in verbal 'theory-of-mind' 
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tasks with older children.  Although even those verbal tasks have remained amenable 
to alternative rule-based interpretations, one argument in favour of a 'false belief' 
interpretation of those tasks is that children also exhibit spontaneous false-belief-
based behaviors in a variety of other real-life situations when communicating and 
interacting with others.  Similarly, to understand the scope of infant 'theory-of-mind', 
it is crucial to understand whether and how infants may use their putative social-
cognitive skills.   Previous research has shown that verbal children productively 
use forward predictions from goal and reality representations to others' mistaken 
actions when they begin to lie around age 4.  In the current study, infants were given 
the chance to help an otherwise unfamiliar person in an unfamiliar setting.  Helping is 
a primary aspect of human cooperative communication that logically precedes higher-
order deceptive motives.  Importantly, infants helped before the person even knew 
that she would need information.  This finding provides new support for theories of 
altruism in infancy.  In extension to previous findings (see Tomasello & Warneken, 
2009), it is clear from the current design that infants did not simply react to an adult's 
expression of an emotional, instrumental or epistemic problem, a request for help, or 
in an attempt to directly remedy an aversive situation.  Instead they helped proactively 
on the mental basis of an anticipated, not yet executed, action mistake.  The type of 
proactive helping as revealed by anticipatory correcting is presumably mostly used for 
communication and primarily based on social-cognitive rather than empathic and 
sympathetic processes (for the latter, see Vaish, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2009).  First, 
through communication one can coordinate with relatively little effort others' actions 
towards a shared goal and so achieve well-coordinated collaborations.  Second, 
communication itself is a shared activity.  Conversations require rapid predictions of 
others' turns in order to initiate one's own communicative act accordingly (de Ruiter, 
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Mitterer & Enfield, 2006; Stivers et al., 2009).  Conversations also require helping 
and correcting each other in maintaining a shared focus and common ground (e.g., 
Clark, 1996). 
 The usage-based approach of the current study reveals that infants are 
motivated to use action predictions productively in the service of unsolicited helpful 
collaborative interactions, several years before they begin to exploit their 
understanding to misinform and lie to others in competitive situation.  Two other 
action-based studies (Buttelmann et al., 2009; Southgate et al., 2010) employed 
indirectly-elicited response tasks and revealed that infants react to another's erroneous 
action appropriately by helping or complying with a request, presumably through 
inferences from the ongoing goal-oriented action to the actor's misrepresentation of 
reality.  The current study employed an elicitation-free action-based task and reveals 
that infants also spontaneously prevent others from committing a mistake, already 
before the respective object-oriented action is initiated, presumably through 
inferences from the actor's goal and reality representations to her expected action.  
Infants use these forward action predictions spontaneously and helpfully to 
communicate with others.  We speculate that infants' behavioral usage of forward 
predictive 'theory-of-mind' skills emerges through, and is first put to service in 
uniquely human forms of collaborative communication.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
One-year-olds warn others about negative action outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
Knudsen, B. & Liszkowski, U. (under revision). One-year-olds warn others about 
negative action outcomes.
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Abstract 
Warning others about unexpected negative action outcomes is a paradigm case of 
communicative helping and prospective action understanding.  The current study 
addressed the ontogeny of warning in infants’ gestural communication.  We found 
that 12- and 18-month-olds (n=84) spontaneously warned an adult by pointing out to 
her an aversive object hidden in her way (Problem condition).  In control conditions 
the object was either positive (No Problem condition) or the adult had witnessed its' 
placing (Problem known condition), which resulted in significantly less pointing.  
Results show that infants intervene spontaneously and in foresight through 
communication, in order to help others avoid a problem before it has occurred.  These 
acts of warning are presumably based on an understanding of others’ negatively 
defined goals (to avoid an outcome) and their incorrect representations of reality.  The 
demonstration of warning in infants lends support to theories of altruism and social-
pragmatic communication competencies before linguistic communication has 
emerged in earnest. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 The ability to anticipate others’ actions is a core aspect of successful human 
social interaction and communication. In most, if not all of our daily social activities, 
for instance, when navigating through traffic, action anticipations help us plan our 
own actions. But humans also use action anticipations to help others. For example, 
humans warn others spontaneously and altruistically of harmful things that should be 
avoided, like an approaching car, a hot object, or poisoned liquid in a falsely labelled 
bottle.  
 Social-cognitively, warning requires one to anticipate and evaluate a person's 
action outcome. First, one needs to understand the person's goal to avoid a certain 
undesired outcome in the course of her action. Second, one needs to understand that 
the person acts on a misrepresentation of reality which leads her inadvertently toward 
the undesired outcome. Motivationally, warning is predicated on a spontaneous 
prosocial motivation for helping and intervening, already before a problem has 
occurred. The communicative act of warning is thus premised on both the social-
cognitive anticipation of a person's undesired action outcome and the prosocial 
motivation to use this understanding productively and intervene helpfully. 
The ontogeny of spontaneous warning behavior is still unknown.  Most relevant to 
this question is the finding that 18- and 12-month-olds help others communicatively 
by providing relevant information through informative pointing.  For example, in 
response to a searching experimenter infants will help her by pointing to the sought-
after object more often than to an irrelevant object (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano & 
Tomasello, 2006), and more often when she has not seen its new location than when 
she has (Liszkowski, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2008).  These studies thus suggest that 
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infants understand something about others' goal and reality representations, and are 
motivated to help by providing relevant information. 
The cognitive interpretation of these studies is supported by recent looking-time 
studies.  First, with regard to goal understanding, 13-month-olds look longer at a 
single event in which a goal-directed action does not result in the expected outcome 
than when it does, suggesting that infants infer unseen action outcomes (Southgate & 
Csibra, 2009).  Second, with regard to understanding others' reality representations, 
infants in the first half of the second year look longer at action outcomes when these 
are incongruent with the agent's representation of reality than when they are congruent 
(Scott, Baillargeon, Song & Leslie, 2010; Träuble, Marinović & Pauen, 2010; Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2009; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007; Onishi 
& Baillargeon, 2005).  Anticipatory eye-tracking studies reveal more directly that 
infants indeed make predictions about others' actions.  For example, 12-month-olds 
anticipate the location of an action outcome before it is achieved (Falck-Ytter, 
Gredebäck & von Hofsten, 2006), and by 25 months of age infants anticipate the 
location of an action outcome based on the actor's representation of reality that is 
guiding her action (Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007). 
However, it is less clear whether infants also attribute to an agent the goal of avoiding 
an action outcome.  Studies with older children suggest that when confronted with an 
understanding of others' representations of reality, understanding a negatively defined 
desire is somewhat more challenging than understanding a positive desire (Leslie, 
German & Polizzi, 2005).  Further, a recent looking-time study suggests that 14-
month-olds may not yet understand that an actor's action can be governed by the goal 
of avoiding a certain action outcome (Vaish & Woodward, 2010).  In the looking-time 
study, infants were first familiarized with an actor attending and emoting either 
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positively or negatively toward one of two objects.  Then the actor reached for the 
attended or unattended object.  Infants looked equally long at the events in which the 
actor reached for the attended object, irrespective of whether she had previously 
emoted positively or negatively about it.  Results suggest that infants ascribe goals 
only on the basis of attentional cues.  They may not yet understand negative emotions 
as a cue to the actor's intention to avoid a certain outcome, which is a necessary 
cognitive requirement for the act of warning.   
With regard to the motivational interpretation of informative pointing, further studies 
on instrumental helping corroborate the interpretation that infants have a prosocial 
motivation.  For example, 14-month-olds will help an adult instrumentally in attaining 
his goal when he encounters a problem in achieving the goal on his own (Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2007).  Further, 18-month-olds will help an experimenter instrumentally 
when she mistakenly tries to retrieve a toy from a wrong location (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter & Tomasello, 2009).  One caveat of these studies of instrumental and 
communicative helping (for empathic helping, see Bishof-Köhler, 1991), however, is 
that infants always reacted in response to a problematic situation, to an adult 
expressing difficulties, or to an adult's request for help.  The studies thus did not test 
whether infants intervene spontaneously on the basis of an anticipated problem that 
has not yet occurred, which is a key motivational aspect of warning. 
Taken together, previous findings on informative pointing and infants' social-
cognitive processing suggest that the act of warning may be within infants' reach in 
their second year of life.  Motivationally, it is still somewhat unclear to what extend 
infants will intervene fully spontaneously, without external response elicitation.  
Cognitively, it is still unknown when infants begin to understand others' goals of 
avoiding certain outcomes.  In the studies on informative pointing infants always 
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pointed to an object which the adult desired, with the intention that she would find it 
and approach it.  When warning, however, one draws attention to an undesirable 
object with the intention that it should be avoided.  Thus, one has to understand 
another's negative, not positive, desire for a particular object.  To date it has not been 
addressed whether infants also point at negative, undesirable entities or events.   
In the current study we investigated whether 12- and 18-month-old infants inform 
others about a prospective negative action outcome.  We tested whether infants would 
anticipate others' undesired action outcomes based on goal and belief attributions, and 
be motivated to intervene on the basis of this anticipation. In three conditions, infants 
watched an adult act on a toy and accidentally bump into an object in the course of her 
actions. Subsequently, she always removed the object from the scene. Later another 
adult accidentally pushed the object back to its previous location. We manipulated the 
first adult's goal towards the object by altering its relevance for the adult's ongoing 
action: The adult emoted either positively surprised about the object, but the object 
was otherwise irrelevant to her action (No Problem condition), or she expressed 
distress and negative emotions (pain or disgust) about the object, clearly wanting to 
avoid it (Problem condition).  In addition, we manipulated the adult's information 
about the location of the object.  Either she did not witness that the second adult re-
placed the object back to its original location (Problem condition), or she did 
(Problem known condition). At test the first adult re-entered the scene. We measured 
infants’ spontaneous, uncued pointing behavior toward the object upon the adult's 
return.  Previous research has established that infants point communicatively from 12 
months of age (Bates, Camaioni & Volterra, 1979; Liszkowski et al., 2004; 2008).  
Based on the reviewed literature, we expected that infants would point out the 
aversive object for the adult in the Problem condition, when she wanted to avoid the 
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object and had incorrect information about its location.  However, they should point 
less in the Problem known condition, when the adult already knew about the object's 
location; and they should point less in the No Problem condition, when the object was 
irrelevant to her acting. We also coded for point accompanying negative emotional 
behaviors which may provide some further indication for the act of warning. 
3.2. Method 
Participants 
 Infants were recruited from a database of parents who volunteered to 
participate in infancy research.  Forty-eight 18-month-olds (26 boys; M age= 18;27, 
range = 18;8-19;9) and 36 12-month-olds (17 boys; M age= 12;19, range = 12;7-13;3) 
participated in the study. Nine 18-month-olds had to be excluded: one in the Problem 
before condition for fussiness, five in the Problem after condition (three for fussiness, 
two for parental interference), and three in the Problem known condition (two for 
parental interference, one for fussiness). Two 12-month-olds had to be excluded, one 
in the Problem condition for fussiness, one in the Problem known condition because 
of technical failure. Five individual trials of the 18-month-olds had to be discarded: 
three in the Problem before condition (one for parental interference, two because of 
experimenter error), one in the Problem after condition, and one in the No problem 
condition (both for parental interference). Five individual trials of the 12-month-olds 
had to be discarded: three in the Problem known condition for fussiness, and two in 
the No problem condition for parental interference. Seven 12-month-olds participated 
only in three trials. 
Materials  
 The right panel of Figure 1 displays four different, self-designed marble toys 
(35 x 47 x 15 cm). A marble track led to a dish on the right bottom of the toy. At the 
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bottom middle of the toy was a horizontal transparent plastic tube with one opening to 
the left and one opening to the right.  The right side of the opening led to the marble 
dish.  All toys made interesting sounds when the marbles were rolling down, and they 
were covered up from the backside, so that E1 could not see through.  One of four 
different objects was used for each marble toy: (i) a drain covered with red tape, (ii) a 
grey, crumpled-up tissue (iii) a plastic slice of a toy-pomegranate that was painted 
brown, and (iv) a small, plastic bag containing a black toy-substance.. 
Set-up  
 The left panel of Figure 1 displays the schematic set-up. Infants sat on their 
parents lap at a table in the back of a testing room (4.60 x 4.60 m).  They faced E1 
who sat on the other side of the table.  The marble toy was placed on the infant's right 
side of the table, in front of E1 and approximately 65 cm away from the infant.  A 
small opaque barrier (22 x 38 cm) was positioned on the infant's left side of the table.  
The entrances to the scene were at the front of the room to the infants' left and right. A 
room divider (2.00 x 1.45 m) about 80 cm to infants' left of the table partitioned off 2 
x 1 m of the room. Behind the room divider hid E2 and watched the procedure on a 
video screen that was hooked up to four cameras providing full view on the entire 
room.  
3.  One-year-olds warn others 
59 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Left panel: Schematic drawing of the set-up. An overhead camera that was mounted onto the 
ceiling right above the middle of the table is not depicted here. E1 sat with the parent and the infant 
across the table. E1 had a marble toy placed in front of her. E2 hid behind a room divider. During test 
E1 approached the table on a predefined approach path (entering via the door or appearing from behind 
the cupboard). Right panel: Marble toys, one for each trial. E1 reached around the toy from her right 
side through the tube to the dish containing the marbles. Objects were placed in front of the tube.  
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Procedure 
 Infants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. All conditions 
consisted of 4 trials with a brief play break after two trials. Each trial included a 
demonstration phase, a switch phase and a test phase. 
 Demonstration phase: E1 put the marble toy on the table.  The order of the 
marble toys was fixed across subjects (green, blue, white, pink; see right panel Figure 
1).  She said: "Let's play with this one. Look what I can do!"  She inserted three 
marbles one by one and let them roll down the track into the dish.  After she had 
inserted the last marble she said: "This is fun, let's play with it again".  With her right 
hand she reached around the marble toy through the plastic tube to the dish with the 
marbles.  As she was reaching, her hand bumped into an object that was lying in front 
of the tube.  The order of objects was quasi-counterbalanced, with half of the subjects 
receiving the order of objects (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); the other half the order of objects (iii), 
(iv), (i), (ii).   
 In the Problem condition, E1 acted as if the object was either disgusting or hot 
(for two consecutive trials).  The order was counterbalanced across participants.  She 
emoted negatively with facial expressions of disgust or pain, saying: "Yak (Ouch)! 
What is this?" She pushed the object with the back of the hand to the middle of the 
table, saying with the same facial expression: "Yak (Ouch), this is disgusting (hot)! I 
need to put it away."  Then she pushed the object behind the barrier, out of her - but 
not the infant's sight, and said with satisfaction "Well, now we can play again." With 
every comment E1 alternated gaze with the infant.  For the 18-month-olds, we 
administered two variants of the problem condition to ensure that infants did not 
simply perceive the object as an obstacle for the experimenter to achieve her goal: In 
the Problem before variant (12 infants) E1 bumped into the object before she could 
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retrieve a marble from the dish.  In the Problem after variant (12 infants), she bumped 
into the object after she had already retrieved a marble from the dish.  Since we did 
not find any differences between these variants (see Results), we administered in our 
follow-up experiment with 12-month-olds only the Problem after variant. The latter is 
a more stringent test of empathic rather than goal-oriented warning since the actor 
fulfills her goal of retrieving marbles and experiences the aversive situation only 
afterwards. 
 In the No problem condition, the procedure was the same as in the Problem 
condition.  E1 emoted equally saliently but positively about the object with facial 
expressions of positive surprise, acting as if the object was either nice or soft (in two 
consecutive trials).  She said with positive surprise: "Oh (Wow)! What is this?” She 
put the object in the middle of the table and said “This is nice (soft)! I can put it here."  
She took the object with her hands and put it behind the occluder.  E1 established 
during the procedure that infants attended in both conditions to the salient object 
encounters and the object transpositions.  Infants attended to these aspects equally 
since E1 addressed them directly and since it was the only thing that happened on 
stage.  
 All conditions continued with E1 retrieving and playing with one more 
marble. After that, she reached again around the marble toy to the dish but then 
interrupted her activity, pretending that she had to leave for a moment.  She tapped on 
the marble toy and said "Oh, I have to leave. But we go on with it in a minute, okay?" 
Then she left the scene. 
 Switch phase: E2 appeared from her hiding place, greeted the infant and 
started to clean the table with a cloth. She accidentally bumped into the object lying 
behind the occluder and emoted as E1 had done before, depending on the condition.  
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She emoted three times, first upon touching it, then when pushing the object with the 
back of the hand to the middle of the table.  Then she continued cleaning but bumped 
into it again, emoted a third time and put the object without gaze alternation, while 
looking into a different direction, unintentionally back to its original location on the 
marble toy.  She cleaned the last bit of the table and said with satisfaction: "Well, now 
it's clean again" and hid.  In the Problem and No problem conditions E1 was outside 
the room.   
 In the Problem known condition, the procedure was the same as in the 
Problem condition, but E1 came back into the room earlier.  She greeted E2 and then 
watched the entire sequence from about a meter away from the table.  When the 
object had been removed back to its original location, E2 addressed E1 by calling her 
name, whereupon E1 approached the table and looked at the object.  She said in a 
neutral tone of voice "Ah, okay" and looked to the infant.  Then E1 and E2 took leave.  
Finally, to equate for the absence of E1 across conditions, E1 left the room again for a 
few seconds saying: "I quickly have to check something".  From piloting and the 
actual testing procedure it was clear that infants did look at E1 when she entered the 
room and greeted E2, and when she approached the table after E2's sequence.  E2 
established that infants attended to her cleaning actions, emotional expressions and 
object transpositions by addressing them directly, just like in the other two conditions.   
 Test phase:  This phase was the same in all three conditions.  E1 came back 
into the room, stood still at the door and said “Now we can play again.”  Then she 
walked an L-shaped path toward the table, first in parallel (2m) then approaching it 
perpendicular (2m). On two predefined spots E1 stood still and said "Okay, let's go 
on". The test phase (about 30 seconds) was over as soon as E1 had sat down.  If 
infants pointed during this period, E1 responded by saying “Yes” and continued with 
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her predetermined sequence.  The test phase ended with E1 reaching around the 
marble toy and bumping into the object again. She then cleaned up the marble toy in 
order to get another one to play with. 
Coding and data analysis  
 Hand- and index-finger pointing with half or fully extended arm to the object 
during the test phase were coded from video tapes. We also coded points to the 
marble dish during the test phase, to measure infants' request to go on with the game 
('proto-imperative pointing', e.g, Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998).  The latter 
were coded to explore whether infants in the Problem condition would find it more 
relevant to point out the aversive object than to request going on with the marble 
game.  Excellent inter-rater reliability was obtained from 25% of the data coded, 
Cohen's Kappa=.88.  The percentage of agreement only for the points that main and 
reliability coders coded was 74%.  Inspection of the video recordings revealed that all 
infants looked at E1 upon her return and as she was approaching the table.  Therefore, 
and since previous studies have found problems with its validity (see Liszkowski et 
al., 2008), gaze alternation was not coded as an indication of communicative intent.  
However, previous experimental studies on pointing have shown that infants point as 
a function of social-communicative contexts.  In addition, test phases with a point to 
the object were coded for the presence or absence of features indicative of warning 
behavior. These were behaviors like turning away, saying 'yak' or 'ouch', negative 
facial expressions (frowning, wrinkled nose, protruded tongue), shaking head or 
saying 'no' in response to 'let's go on', negative vocalizations like 'ew' and hand shape 
(open hand with palm forward or arm, hand or fingers moving sideways or up and 
down as in "no" or "not"). Cohen's Kappa for the presence or absence of any of these 
accompanying warning features was .84.  Data diverged significantly from the normal 
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distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, p< .05) and were analyzed non-
parametrically for each age group separately.  The experimental manipulations were 
set up to make two planned one-tailed comparisons following our expectations: (i) 
Problem vs. Problem known condition, and (ii) Problem vs. No problem condition.  
No alternative pattern other than that of the null-hypothesis was predicted. 
 
3.3. Results 
18-month-olds 
 The two variants of the Problem condition did not differ significantly from 
each other with regard to the number of infants who pointed at least once to the object 
(Problem before: 9 of 12 infants; Problem after: 8 of 12 infants, Fisher's Exact, p=1) 
and the mean number of points to the object (.597 vs. .785; Mann-Whitney U, 
p=.799).  Therefore, the two variants of the Problem condition were collapsed in 
subsequent analyses.  The left panel of Figure 2 shows that significantly more 18-
month-olds pointed at least once to the object in the Problem condition (17/24) 
compared to the Problem known (3/12) and the No problem condition (3/12), Fisher's 
Exact p's=.012, Cramer'sV's=.435.2
                                                 
2 The pattern remained significant when comparing the Problem before (9/12) and the Problem after 
(8/12) conditions separately to the Problem known and the No problem conditions (respectively, 
Fisher's Exact’s, p=.02, p=.02, p=.05, p=.05). 
  Similarly, the left panel of Figure 3 shows that 
18-month-olds' mean number of points to the object were significantly higher in the 
Problem compared to the Problem known and No problem conditions, Mann-Whitney 
U, p=.023, r=-.35; p=.034, r=-.32, respectively.  This pattern of results was already 
present in the first trial:  More 18-month-olds pointed in their first trial in the Problem 
condition (13/22) compared to the Problem known (3/12) or No Problem conditions 
(2/12), Fisher's Exact, p=.06, Cramer'sV=.326, p=.02, Cramer'sV=.408, respectively.  
Similarly, 18-month-olds pointed in the first trial more often in the Problem condition 
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(M=1.18) than the Problem known (Mean=.33) or No Problem conditions 
(Mean=.25), Mann Whitney U, p=.04, r=-.41, p=.022, r=-.48, respectively.  The 
number of infants who pointed to the object in the Problem condition decreased over 
trials, Cochran's Q (n= 20), p=.011, possibly indicating fatigue or familiarization 
effects, but excluding learning of the target behavior within the experiment.  The type 
of negative expressions in the Problem condition (disgust vs. hot) had no effect, 
Wilcoxon, p=.551.   
12-month-olds 
 As depicted in the right panel of Figure 2, 12-month-olds also performed 
according to our predictions: significantly more infants pointed to the object in the 
Problem condition (10/12) as compared to the Problem known (4/12) and the No 
problem conditions (4/12), both Fisher's Exact p's=.018, Cramer'sV's=.507. The right 
panel of Figure 3 shows that 12-month-olds' mean numbers of points to the object 
were significantly higher in the Problem condition compared to the Problem known 
and No problem conditions, Mann-Whitney U, p=.024, r=-.47; p=.051, r=-.36, 
respectively.  This pattern of results was similar in the first trial, but failed to reach 
significance:  More 12-month-olds pointed in their first trial in the Problem condition 
(6/12) compared to the Problem known (2/12) or No Problem conditions (3/11), 
Fisher's Exact, p=.097, Cramer'sV=.354, p=.247, Cramer'sV=.233 respectively.  
Similarly, 12-month-olds pointed in the first trial slightly more often in the Problem 
condition (M=.67) than the Problem known (Mean=.42) or No Problem conditions 
(Mean=.55), Mann Whitney U, p=.133, r=-.28; p=.174, r=-.24, respectively. The 
number of infants pointing towards the object did not differ across trials Cochran's Q 
(n=12, based on three trials), p=.895, thus excluding learning of the target behavior 
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within the experiment. The type of negative expressions in the Problem condition 
(disgust vs. hot) had no effect (Wilcoxon, p=.504). 
 When comparing the 12-month-olds with the 18-month-olds in the Problem 
condition, there were no significant differences with regard to the number of infants 
who pointed at least once (Fisher's Exact Test, p=.86), nor with regard to the mean 
number of points to the object (Mann-Whitney U, p=.69).  
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Figure 2. Number of infants who pointed to the object at least once. Left: Results for the 18-month-
olds. Right: Results for the 12-month-olds.  
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Figure 3. Mean number of points per trial to the object. Left: Results for the 18-month-olds. Right: 
Results for the 12-month-olds. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means. 
 
Additional analyses  
 To further explore infants' pointing in the Problem condition we looked at the 
frequency of point-accompanying features possibly indicative of warning.  In the 
Problem condition, 18- and 12-month-olds expressed accompanying warning 
behaviors respectively in 21% and 24% of the trials with a point.  In the Problem 
known condition these accompanying features occurred only half as often in 
respectively 11% and 14% of the trials with a point. In the No problem condition, 
when there was nothing to warn about, these accompanying features never occurred.  
The condition differences were statistically not significant, presumably since the cell 
numbers were low, especially in the Problem known and No problem conditions, 
when infants rarely pointed (1's and 0's, respectively). 
 To investigate whether infants found it more relevant to inform about the 
aversive object than to request going on with the marble game we investigated the 
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distribution of points to the object compared to the marbles on the marble dish.  In the 
Problem condition, 18-month-olds pointed significantly more often to the object 
(M=.69) than the marbles (M=.30) (Wilcoxon, p=.011, two-tailed), whereas the 
reverse was true for the Problem known condition (object M=.23 vs. marbles M=.90) 
and the No Problem condition (object M=.29 vs. marbles M=.77), Wilcoxon, both 
p's=.007, two-tailed.  Thus, when there was an object to be warned about, infants 
mostly pointed out that object.  When there was nothing to warn about, infants mostly 
pointed to the marbles, presumably to request continuing the game.  In contrast, the 
12-month-olds pointed about the same amount to both locations across conditions 
(Problem condition: object M=.63 vs. marbles M=.85; Problem known condition: 
object M=.23 vs. marbles M=.32; No Problem condition: object M=.36 vs. marbles 
M=.38). 
 
3.4. Discussion 
 Twelve- and 18-month-old infants spontaneously pointed out an aversive 
object that was in the adult's way. Infants intervened before the undesired outcome 
occurred, that is, already before the adult showed signs of contacting the object.  The 
pattern of pointing across the experimental manipulations suggests that infants 
intervened by anticipating and evaluating the adult’s action with regard to her goal 
and current representation of reality. These findings suggest that infants have 
expectations about others' future actions, and that they are motivated to help others 
avoid unintended outcomes spontaneously, that is, even in the absence of an external 
response elicitation.  
 Regarding infants’ social-cognitive skills, results suggest that both age groups 
anticipated and evaluated the adult’s action relative to (i) her goal about the object, 
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and (ii) her representation of its location. First, when the adult had not witnessed the 
location change, infants pointed significantly more often to the object in the Problem 
condition in which the adult wanted to avoid it, compared to the No Problem 
condition in which the object was otherwise irrelevant to her action.  In accordance 
with other studies (Southgate & Csibra, 2009; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006) infants 
presumably understood the adult's positive goal of retrieving the marbles.  However, 
in addition, and contrary to recent findings (Vaish & Woodward, 2010), infants also 
understood the adult's negatively defined sub-goal of avoiding the object when it was 
aversive.  It is important to note that when the object was positive, infants did not treat 
it as the adult's positively defined goal of approaching it.  This is presumably because 
the adult did not express any signs of wanting or searching for the object, and because 
she removed it out of her sight despite emoting positively about it.  The difference 
between the current and the Vaish and Woodward (2010) findings is likely due to 
procedural differences.  For example, in the current study there was a hierarchy of 
goals, with the overall goal being the marble game, within which one sub-goal was to 
avoid a specified negative outcome.  Instead, in Vaish and Woodward (2010) the 
actor's reach was not embedded in further activities.  One possible interpretation of 
their 'incongruent' test events could thus be that the agent reached for the negative 
object to remove it.  Another difference is that the adult in the current study acted live 
and pretended fairly convincingly that she hurt herself badly or was severely 
disgusted when removing the object, thus expressing her negatively defined desire 
very clearly. 
 Second, when the adult wanted to avoid the object, infants pointed 
significantly more when she had not witnessed its location change (Problem 
condition) compared to when she had witnessed the change (Problem known 
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condition).  Presumably, infants understand that others can hold information which 
does not correspond to current reality.  This interpretation is corroborated by previous 
findings on informative pointing (Liszkowski et al., 2008; Knudsen & Liszkowski, 
2011) and other recent false belief studies (Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2010; 
Buttelmann et al., 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009).  
One should note that procedural aspects of the current design excluded the possibility 
that infants attributed correct information states only on the basis of perceptual co-
presence (Fabricius, Boyer, Weimer & Carroll, 2010), since after the adult had 
witnessed the object change she still left the scene and only then re-entered. 
In the current study, our measure was recorded in an anticipation phase, that is, before 
the test outcome.  Previous action-based tasks have confronted infants with an 
experimenter's goal-directed action (Buttelmann et al., 2009, Liszkowski et al., 2008; 
Southgate et al., 2010).  In those paradigms infants thus had to make sense of the 
ongoing goal-oriented action presumably by reasoning backwards to the actor's goals.  
Instead, in the current design infants had to reason forward and anticipate and 
evaluate an action outcome based on an understanding of the adult's goal and reality 
representations.  This suggests that infants use their social-cognitive skills also 
prospectively to predict others' actions and intervene communicatively.  
Motivationally, the study reveals a form of proactive helping. In earlier helping 
paradigms infants complied with an adult’s request for help (e.g. Liszkowski, et al., 
2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007) or acted in response to an adult's distress 
(Bischof-Köhler, 1991). In this study, however, at test, the adult did not request any 
help nor did the adult show any signs of distress. Infants thus provided unsolicited 
help to an adult, revealing their prosocial motivation to help others, which gives 
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further support for theories of altruism in early infancy (Warneken & Tomasello, 
2009). 
 The age comparison of the main measures revealed no significant differences 
between the age groups, indicating that the social-cognitive skills and the prosocial 
motivation to warn others already emerge by 12 months of age, when infants have just 
begun pointing. Additional analyses suggested subtle differences between age groups. 
First, at 18 months infants showed the expected pattern between conditions already in 
their first trial, while 12-month-olds' first trial performance showed only a trend 
towards the expected direction but did not reach statistical significance.  One should 
note, however, that the sample size was also smaller, possibly reducing statistical 
power.  Second, the additional analysis on the points to the marble dish revealed 
subtle differences. In contrast to 12-month-olds, 18-month-olds pointed in the 
Problem condition more to the object than to the marbles.  For 18-month-olds it was 
presumably more relevant to warn about the object than to request going on with the 
game.  This could suggest that between 12 and 18 months infants learn to structure 
their communicative acts with respect to what is most relevant in a given situation.  
Communicative experience in contextualized second-person interactions may provide 
the grounds for age-related, more subtle refinements in the use of pointing.  Overall, 
however, the similar pattern of results in the main measure, and the significant 
condition differences at both ages, suggest that infants begin to warn others' about 
negative action outcomes around 12 months of age.  
 Additional analyses on the point accompanying features support the 
interpretation that infants pointed to warn the adult about the presence of a harmful 
object.  Infants' pointing in the problem conditions was accompanied by warning 
features that have previously not been observed with other types of pointing.  These 
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were absent in the No Problem condition, although the differences failed to reach 
statistical significance.  Pointing to warn others is a subtype of the previously 
demonstrated informative motive.  Current findings establish that infants provide 
relevant information spontaneously, without any elicitation, and that infants also 
inform about objects that are not desired by them or others and should be avoided, not 
approached.  The findings thus support the social-cognitive and prosocial 
interpretation of informative pointing.  It is also important to note that all conditions 
were matched for saliency in acting, and that it was made sure during testing that all 
infants watched the relevant steps.  While it is theoretically possible that infants 
process negative stimuli deeper or differently from positive stimuli, this alone cannot 
explain the differences in pointing we found - since then the two conditions with 
negative stimuli (Problem versus Problem known condition) should not have differed 
from each other.  It was also not the case that infants allocated less attention to the 
object in the Problem known condition when there were two adults.  This is because 
the adults acted sequentially, and E2 made sure that infants watched her acting and the 
object transpositions just as in the other conditions; only after this did E1 step forward 
and elicited infants' attention.   
 The findings moderate previous suggestions that infants point exclusively to 
request information (Southgate, van Maanen & Csibra, 2007). First, in the current 
design the adult had already expressed information about the object (i.e. positive or 
negative valence) before the infant pointed in the test phase.  Thus, the object was not 
new to the infant, and the infant had already obtained relevant information.  Second, 
there is no a priori reason why infants should request less information about a positive 
than a negative object.  In the same vein, it is not apparent why infants would request 
less information about a negative object when the adult had witnessed the object’s 
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replacement as opposed to when she had not.  While we certainly do not doubt that an 
interrogative motive may exist (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Liszkowski, 2005), the 
current findings are better understood as a demonstration of infants' rich and flexible 
use of pointing for various motives (Tomasello, Carpenter & Liszkowski, 2007), 
including such things like helpfully informing and warning others. 
Human social interaction and communication are predicated on social-cognitive skills 
and a cooperative motivation. The current study adds to the accumulating ontogenetic 
evidence that both these aspects are present by 12 months of age, when infants have 
just begun pointing, and before they communicate with language in earnest.  Warning 
is a paradigm case of helpful and prospective intervening.  It is a reasonable 
speculation that acts of prospective intervening originate within cooperative 
communication.  The flexibility with which infants pointed across conditions supports 
social-cognitively 'rich' accounts and reveals an action-based usage of social 
understanding in the case of prospective helpful warning.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
18-month-olds predict specific action mistakes through 
attribution of false belief, not ignorance,  
and intervene accordingly 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
Knudsen, B. & Liszkowski, U. (in press). 18-month-olds predict specific action 
mistakes through attribution of false belief, not ignorance, and intervene accordingly. 
Infancy.
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Abstract 
The current study employed a new 'anticipatory intervening' paradigm to tease apart 
false belief and ignorance-based interpretations of 18-month-olds' helpful informing. 
We investigated in three experiments whether 18-months-old infants inform an adult 
selectively about one of two locations depending on the adult's belief about which of the 
two locations held her toy. In Experiment 1 and 2 the adult falsely believed that one of 
the locations held her toy.  In Experiment 3 the adult was ignorant about which of the 
two locations held her toy. In all cases, however, the toy had been removed from the 
locations, and the locations contained instead materials which the adult wanted to avoid. 
In Experiment 1 and 2, infants spontaneously and selectively informed the adult about 
the aversive material in the location the adult falsely believed to hold her toy. In 
contrast, in Experiment 3 infants informed the ignorant adult about both locations 
equally.  Results reveal that infants expected the adult to commit a specific action 
mistake when she held a false belief, but not when she was ignorant.  Further, infants 
were motivated to intervene proactively.  Findings reveal a predictive action-based 
usage of 'theory-of-mind' skills at 18 months of age. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements:  
Loraen Kaltenschnee, Margret van Beuningen, Marloes van der Goot, Stephanie Voigt, 
Merel Fokkema, Mireille Hassemer (data collection) & Nick Wood (toy building, digi-
service).  
18-month-olds attribute false beliefe, not ignorance 
77 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Recent action-based studies suggest that infants in their second year of life use 
false belief understanding to guide their social actions.  Findings show that infants 
interact differently with an adult who is misinformed about the referent of an interaction 
compared to an adult who is accurately informed.  For example, in one study 17-month-
old infants were first trained to retrieve an object from one of two boxes to which an 
adult pointed (Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2010).  Subsequently, the objects in the 
boxes were swapped.  In a true belief condition, the adult saw the swap.  At test, infants 
retrieved the object from the box to which the adult pointed.  However, in a false belief 
condition the adult did not witness that the objects in the boxes were swapped.  When 
the adult now pointed to one of the boxes to request an object, infants retrieved the 
object from the opposite box.  Thus, infants apparently appealed to the adult's false 
belief and inferred that she wanted the object that was currently in the other box (for a 
similar paradigm with slightly older, verbal children, see Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 
2002).   
Similarly, in another study 18-month-old infants were first trained to help an 
adult open one of two boxes (Buttelmann, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2009).  
Subsequently, in a false belief condition, the adult had not witnessed that someone had 
switched a toy from one to the other box.  When the adult then attempted to open the 
now-empty box, infants opened the opposite box for the adult.  However, in a true belief 
condition, when the adult had seen the switch and now tried to open the empty box, 
infants helped him to open that box.  Thus, depending on what the adult had seen 
previously, infants apparently attributed different goals to her (respectively, either the 
goal to retrieve a toy from a box, or to open an empty box).  The two studies suggest 
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that infants consider an adult's epistemic state when reacting socially.  However, the 
studies also raise important questions regarding the usage and the kind of mental 
attributions infants make when acting socially.   
 One question is whether infants act helpfully and appropriately not only in 
reaction to but also in anticipation of an adult's mistaken action.  Predicting others' 
action mistakes and intervening accordingly is a key skill of efficient and helpful 
collaborative interaction and communication.  The aforementioned action-based studies 
follow the 'explanation'-type structure of classical theory-of-mind tasks ("Why is she 
pointing to/acting on that box?").  Relatively less is known about infants' active and 
helpful intervening in 'prediction'-tasks ("Where will she search for her toy?").  Two 
recent action-based paradigms suggest that 12- to 18-month-olds infants help a 
misinformed adult by communicating to her relevant information before she will act 
mistakenly.  In one study, 18-month-old infants corrected an adult in anticipation of her 
searching for an object in a wrong location (Knudsen & Liszkowski, in press).  In the 
experiment, infants watched as an adult searched for an object and found it in the last of 
four containers.  In her absence the object was then moved to the first container.  At test, 
when the adult re-entered the room, infants spontaneously helped her find the object by 
pointing to the object’s new location.  In contrast, infants did not inform the adult in 
control conditions, when she had either seen the transfer of the object, or when it had 
not been her intention to find the object.  In a second study, Knudsen & Liszkowski 
(2011) found that 12- and 18-month-olds warned an adult in anticipation of her acting 
towards an undesired outcome.  In the experiment, infants watched as an adult 
pretended to hurt herself on an object and subsequently avoid it.  In her absence, the 
object was then moved into her way.  At test, when the adult re-entered the room, 
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infants spontaneously pointed to the object the adult intended to avoid.  Infants pointed 
significantly less in control conditions, when the adult had witnessed its reappearance, 
or when the object had previously caused no harm and the adult did not intend to avoid 
it.  These two studies thus suggest that infants in their second year use mental state 
attributions about others' intentions and epistemic states not only when reacting to 
others' actions, but also to intervene proactively and spare others mistakes or harm. 
 However, a second question is what kind of epistemic states infants attribute.  It 
has been argued that infants simply attribute ignorance - the lack of knowledge - rather 
than a false representation of reality.  For example, in the experiments infants may have 
realized that the experimenter did not witness the transfer of an object and therefore did 
not know where it was (as opposed to believing it was in the wrong location).  They 
may have then applied a rule of the kind ‘Doesn’t know - gets it wrong’ and inferred the 
correct response without attributing false belief (Ruffman, 1996; Garnham & Ruffman, 
2001; Fabricius, 2003).  Looking-time studies, which measure reactions to action 
outcomes (e.g., Keen, 2003), however, suggest that this is not the case.  18-month-old 
infants apparently differentiate between false belief and ignorance, as indicated by 
longer looking-times to an agent who has a false belief but acts correctly compared to 
an agent who is ignorant but acts correctly (Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 
2010).  However, for action-based explanation-type tasks the alternative explanation is 
still troublesome, since one may help an adult for both reasons, either because of her 
lack of knowledge, or because of her misguided assumption about reality.   
 Action-based prediction-tasks can in principle be solved in this alternative way, 
too.  Another non-verbal prediction-task has employed visual anticipation measures.  
Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) trained 25-month-olds to make anticipatory gaze-
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shifts to one of two windows through which an adult would make a reach to obtain a toy 
from an opaque box in front of that window.  Subsequently, the adult did not witness 
that the object was switched from one to the other box and thereafter removed from the 
scene all together.  The finding was that infants anticipated a reach through the window 
where the adult falsely believed the object to be (i.e., where she had last seen it).  The 
study suggests that 2-year-olds attributed false belief and not ignorance, because the 
desired object had been removed all together from the scene and so the locations to 
which the actor could potentially make a reach were technically both wrong.  Had 
infants expected the actor to simply "get it wrong" they should have expected her to 
reach in either location.  This was not the obtained pattern, thus making an ignorance-
based interpretation less likely.  On the other hand, the study did not administer an 
ignorance condition to compare performance under such conditions more directly.  
Either way, current action-based studies of both the 'explanation'-type paradigm 
(Southgate et al., 2010; Buttelmann et al., 2009) and the new 'anticipatory intervening' 
paradigm (Knudsen & Liszkowski, in press, 2011) are still amenable to an ignorance-
based interpretation. 
 In the current study, we sought to tease apart the ignorance and false belief 
interpretations in a predictive action-based paradigm.  We employed a paradigm that 
combined the logic of the anticipatory looking study by Southgate et al. (2007) and the 
action-based measure of anticipatory intervening previously used by Knudsen and 
Liszkowski (in press; 2011).  In three experiments we tested whether 18-month-old 
infants would expect an adult to approach one of two boxes, depending on her belief 
about it containing a desired toy.  In Experiment 1 an adult falsely believed that her 
desired object was in one of two boxes, when in reality it had been removed from the 
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scene all together (as in Southgate et al., 2007).  In addition, both boxes were 
'contaminated' with aversive, to-be-avoided material (as in Knudsen & Liszkowski, 
2011).  Following Knudsen and Liszkowski (2011) we expected infants to intervene 
when appropriate and try to spare the adult the mishap of reaching into the aversive 
material by pointing it out to her in advance.  Based on the recent findings that infants' 
looking-times differentiate between false belief and ignorance-based actions (Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 2010), infants should attribute a false belief to the adult 
and expect her to approach the box which she falsely believed to contain her desired 
toy. Thus, we predicted that infants would inform the adult selectively about the 
aversive material in that location (e.g., to warn her appropriately).  Experiment 2 
addressed procedural aspects and controlled for possible alternative explanations of 
Experiment 1.  To confirm that infants did not use ignorance attributions in Experiments 
1 and 2, we tested infants' performance in an ignorance condition in Experiment 3.  
Experiment 3 used the same paradigm as Experiments 1 & 2, except that the adult was 
ignorant about which of the two boxes held her object.  Consequently, if infants 
correctly attributed ignorance to the adult (Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 
2010), they should expect her to approach either box by chance and inform her about 
the aversive material in both locations equally. 
 
4.2. Experiment 1 
 4.2.1 Method 
Participants 
 Infants were recruited from a database of parents who had volunteered to 
participate in infancy research. Nineteen 18-month-olds (8 boys; M age= 18;12, range= 
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17;26-18;27) participated in the study. Five additional infants had to be excluded from 
analyses, because of fussiness (2), parental interference (2) or technical failure (1). 
Eight individual trials of seven infants had to be discarded, because of parental 
interference (2), experimenter error (1), technical failure (1), or fussiness (4).  
Set-up 
 Infants sat on their parents' lap at the long side of a table.  The table was 
centered in the back of the testing room.  Infants faced the main experimenter (E1) who 
sat across the infant at the table.  Behind E1, approximately 1 meter to her left and right, 
stood two square pillars on the floor (about 1 meter high, 34 cm wide).  Behind E1's 
chair, a straight path was roped-off with four posts (0.5m high).  The path diverged after 
about 2 meters in a T-shape to the left and to the right of the room (approximately 
another 2 meters).  The left path led behind a cupboard (2 meters high), the right path 
led to the door of the room.  Both sides served as entrances to the scene.  About 1.5 
meters to the infant's left, perpendicular to the table's long side, stood a 2 meters long 
room divider (1.45 m high).  Behind the room divider hid a second experimenter (E2), 
watching the procedure on a video screen that was connected to the cameras which 
provided a full view on the scene.  There were five cameras in total.  Two cameras were 
positioned to the far left and right corners on the infant's side, recording the 
experimenter and the room behind her.  A spy camera was attached to the ceiling above 
the table providing a bird's eye view on the infant and the table.  Two additional 
cameras were each hidden in the pillars left and right from E1, providing a close-up 
view on the infant. 
Materials 
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 There were four different sets of three identical containers.  Each set was used in 
one of four trials.  All containers had an opening on the front side, big enough to reach 
in.  Two containers of each set were hidden inside the left and right pillars, the third 
container was hidden under the table.  Each of the containers under the table contained 
one toy: (i) a marble (ii) a plastic duck (iii) a ladybug (iv) a spring with a spinning top 
and a silver ball attached.  Each of the four containers under the table also contained 
objects marked as aversive: (i) grey crumpled-up tissues (ii) green wads of elastics (iii) 
pieces of crumpled, red-grayish plastic nets (iv) green crumpled-up tissues.  Four 
additional, identically looking aversive objects were hidden behind the top of the right 
pillar out of infants’ sight. 
Procedure 
 There were 4 trials with a brief play break after two trials. Each trial consisted of 
four phases: demonstration, epistemic induction, switch, and test. Parents were 
instructed to remain silent during testing and not to interfere with the procedure.  
 Demonstration: E1 placed an empty container from inside each pillar on top of 
each pillar.  The opening of the containers faced the infant.  Then she sat down at the 
table and placed the corresponding container of that set from under the table on the table 
in front of her, with the opening facing the infant.  The infant - but not she - could see 
the toy and the aversive object inside the container.  She said: "Let's play with this."  
She reached from behind into the front opening of the container and bumped into the 
aversive object (see Figure 1, photo 1).  She emoted with facial expressions of disgust, 
saying: "Yak! What is this?”  She pushed the object to the left side of the table, saying 
with the same facial expression: "Yak, this is disgusting!  I have to clean this up."  She 
picked up the object with her thumb and index finger and put it behind the container on 
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top of the left pillar, out of the infant's sight (see Figure 1, photo 2).  Then she reached 
again into the container on the table.  This time she grabbed the toy.  She said "Hey, 
look at this!" and began to playfully insert and then retrieve the toy from the container, 
saying “Now it’s in there….now I’ll get it out again” (see Figure 1, photo 3).   
 Next, E1 took the toy out of the container and removed the container under the 
table.  She turned to one of the two containers on the pillars and playfully inserted and 
retrieved the object in the same manner as before.  Then she turned to the other 
container and played in the same manner (see Figure 1, photos 4-5).  The play sequence 
on both pillar containers was then repeated, thus totaling four play episodes, two on 
each of the containers on the pillars.  The side where the play began was 
counterbalanced across participants and alternated in an a-b-b-a design across the four 
trials.  Then E1 interrupted the play saying "Oh, I have to leave".  She held up the toy 
and said "We go on playing with this in a minute, okay?"  
Epistemic induction: This phase served to establish E1's belief about the toy's 
final location.  Before leaving, E1 put the toy into one container (target container).  This 
was always the opposite container with which she had played last (following the 
counterbalancing above; see Figure 1, photo 6).  She said: "Well, I'll leave it here. See, 
there it is."  To equate for this step toward the target container she then turned to the 
other container (distractor container), adjusted its position by shuffling it around and 
said "All right". With every comment E1 alternated gaze with the infant.  Subsequently, 
she left the scene either through the door or by hiding behind the cupboard, saying 
"Okay, I'll be back in a bit."  For half of the infants, E1’s side of entrance was on the 
same side as the target container in the first two trials, and on the opposite side in the 
next two trials.  The other half got the reverse order.  
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 Switch: In this phase, E2 removed the toy from the scene all together and baited 
both containers with the aversive objects E1 wanted to avoid.  E2 appeared from behind 
the room divider, greeted the infant and started to clean the target container. She 
accidentally found the toy inside the container, took it out, held it up and said "Oh. 
Well, I put it here".  She put it into the distractor container (see Figure 1, photos 7-8).  
Then she turned back to continue cleaning the target container.  Accidentally she 
bumped into the aversive object behind the container.  She emoted with facial 
expressions of disgust and said: "Yak! What is this?" She picked up the object with her 
thumb and index finger, placed it on the table and continued cleaning the container.  
Then she moved on to clean the table and bumped into the object again.  She said with 
the same facial expression: "Yak, this is disgusting!” and moved the object from the 
table into the target container (see Figure 1, photo 9).   
 Then she turned to the distractor container and the sequence was repeated:  She 
encountered the toy inside the distractor container, took it out, and held it up.  She said: 
"Oh. Well, I take this with me," and put the toy demonstratively into her trouser's pocket 
(see Figure 1, photo 10).  She continued cleaning the container, bumped into the 
aversive object behind the container and emoted disgust.  She put the object on the table 
and continued cleaning the container.  Then she turned to clean the table, bumped again 
into the object, emoted disgust, and moved it from the table into the distractor container  
(see Figure 1, photo 11).  Then she finished cleaning the table, said with satisfaction 
"Well, now all is clean," and hid behind the room divider.  By the end, E1's toy had thus 
been removed from the scene and both containers were baited with aversive material. 
 Test:  E1 came back into the room (see Figure 1, photo 12). First she stood still 
and said “Now we can play again.”  Then she walked the roped-off path toward the 
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table (2 x 2m).  On two predefined spots (at the T-junction, and half way towards her 
chair) E1 briefly stopped, looked at the infant, and said "Okay, let's go on".  The test 
phase (about 30 seconds) was over as soon as E1 had sat down.  If infants pointed 
during this period, E1 responded by saying “Yes” and continued her predetermined 
sequence.  All trials ended with E1 reaching into the target container, bumping into the 
aversive object, and emoting disgust.  Then she removed the containers to get "other 
ones to play with" for the next trial. 
Coding and data analysis  
 Pointing was defined as a half or fully extended arm with the open hand palm 
down or the extended index-finger.  The arm was extended in the air and towards 
discernable direction.  The arm extension had to have a clear onset and end, with a clear 
trajectory towards the target or distractor container.  The direction could easily be coded 
from the recording of the bird's eye spy camera above the table.  Points were coded by 
an assistant blind to the hypothesis, if they occurred during the test phase and were 
directed to the target or distractor container.  A second coder, blind to the hypothesis, 
recoded a random subset of 6 infants. Excellent inter-rater reliability was obtained, 
Cohen's Kappa=.92.  In addition, in order to ascertain that E1 did not show in her 
behavior which container she would approach during the test phase, a third coder, blind 
to the hypothesis, judged for all infants in a two-alternative forced choice procedure 
which container E1 would reach into during the test phases. The third coder was at 
chance in predicting the location E1 would reach into, Binominal, p=1. Analyses were 
non-parametric and one-tailed when following our planned comparisons. 
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Figure 1. Staged photos of the general procedure of Experiments 1, 2 and 3. (A) Demonstration: 1. E1 
unintentionally bumps into aversive material.  2. E1 removes the aversive material behind the right pillar.  
3. E1 plays with the toy.  4 & 5. E1 plays with the toy alternately at both containers on the pillars.  
Epistemic induction: 6. E1 has put the toy in one container (target container) and leaves (Note: this step 
differed in Experiment 3). (B) Switch: 7. E2 finds the toy in the target container.  8. E2 puts the toy into 
the distractor container.  9. E2 has bumped into the aversive material and moves it into the target 
container.  10. E2 has taken the toy from the distractor container and puts it demonstratively into her 
pocket.  11. E2 has bumped into the aversive material and moves it into the distractor container. Test:  12. 
The toy is removed from the scene and both boxes are baited with aversive material.  E1 re-enters the 
room and states her intention to continue playing.  She walks a roped-off L-shaped path towards the table. 
 
 4.2.2. Results and Discussion 
 As depicted on the left of Figure 2, infants pointed more often to the target 
container than the distractor container (mean number of points per trial, .711 vs. .410, 
respectively; Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-2.63, p=.004). This pattern was stable 
across infants, with the majority of infants pointing more to the target container than the 
distractor container (63.2%), and only one infant (5%) pointing more to the distractor 
than the target container, Binomial test, p=.002. Similarly, infants’ mean proportion of 
trials in which the first point was directed at the target container was higher (Mean 
Proportion=.373) than the mean proportion of trials in which the first point was directed 
at the distractor container (Mean Proportion=.184), Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-
2.17, p=.02 (see left side of Figure 3).  Thus, infants informed the adult selectively 
about the aversive object in the container from which she was about to retrieve her toy, 
supporting the interpretation that infants attributed to the adult a false belief.  The 
possibility that infants attributed only ignorance to the adult and applied the rule ‘She 
doesn’t know, she gets it wrong’ (Ruffman, 1996; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001), appears 
thus less likely, because then infants should have pointed randomly to the containers 
which had both been emptied and now contained an aversive object. 
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 There was no indication that infants learnt this behavior over trials.  If any, 
infants tended to point more to the target in the first half of the experiment (Mean 
number of points per trial= .84) than in the second half (Mean number of points per 
trial= .44), Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-1.69, p=.091, two-tailed.  Previous action-
based studies (Southgate et al., 2010; Buttelmann et al., 2009) tested performance on a 
single trial only.  However, in those studies, infants were first trained to produce the 
target behavior, and if they did not, they were excluded from the analyses.  In our 
sample, 11 of the 14 infants who pointed at least once (79%) pointed already on the first 
trial.  The first point in the first trial was more often directed towards the target 
container (7/11) than the distractor container (4/11), but this did not reach statistical 
significance (Binominal test, p=.27).  Thus, although there was no learning over trials 
and the pattern of mean differences was already there on the first trial, the first-trial 
differences failed to reach statistical significance, presumably due to the reduced power 
of single-trial analyses and fewer participants.   
Additional analyses revealed that infants' pointing to the target container was not 
biased by the side of the experimenter's entrance, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-
1.41, p=.158 (two-tailed; Mean number of points per trial, Congruent side= .500; 
Incongruent side= .833).  Further, the experimental procedure of the epistemic induction 
excludes the possibility that infants pointed simply to the container E1 last attended, 
since E1 always last attended to the distractor container before she left the scene.  The 
experimental procedure of the switch excludes also the possibility that infants pointed 
simply to where they had last seen the toy, because E2 always moved the toy into the 
distractor container before she removed the toy completely by putting it into her pocket. 
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 However, it might be that infants pointed more to the target container because it 
was more salient or easier to remember.  For example, during the epistemic induction 
E1 spent slightly more time acting on the target container when saying “Well, I leave it 
here. See, there it is" than on the distractor container when saying “All right”.  This 
might have rendered the target container more salient to the infant.  It is theoretically 
also possible that infants only paid attention to the first container E1 acted on during the 
epistemic induction.  Since this was always the target container, infants might have 
simply pointed more to it, because they remembered it better.  In Experiment 2 we 
therefore aimed at replicating the effect while controlling for these alternative 
possibilities. 
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Figure 2. Mean number of points per trial to the target and distractor containers in Experiment 1, 2 and 3. 
Error bars represent the standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 3. Mean proportion of trials in which a first point was directed to the target or distractor container 
in Experiment 1, 2 and 3. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means. 
 
4.3 Experiment 2 
 4.3.1. Method 
Participants 
 Nineteen 18-month-olds (10 boys; M age= 18;20, range = 18;6-18;28) 
participated in the study. Five additional infants had to be excluded from analyses 
because of fussiness (2), parental interference (1), technical failure (1), or experimenter 
error (1).  Six individual trials of 6 infants had to be discarded, because of experimenter 
error (2) or fussiness (4).  
Set-up and Materials 
 The set-up and the materials were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
18-month-olds attribute false beliefe, not ignorance 
92 
 
 The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1 except for two aspects 
during the epistemic induction. First, E1 now acted the same towards each container and 
the sentences were equated for content, length and intonation: In the epistemic induction 
E1 put the toy into the target container and said "Well, I leave it here. See, there it is." 
Regarding the distractor container, E1 reached into the distractor container and said 
"Well, I leave this one empty. See it is empty". Second, the order in which E1 acted on 
the containers (target container first vs. distractor container first) was counterbalanced.  
E1 acted on two consecutive trials either first on the target container or on the distractor 
container.  The order was counterbalanced across infants. As in Experiment 1, E1 left 
the scene by saying "Okay, I'll be back in a bit". Due to a slight imbalance in the design, 
for eight infants E1’s side of entrance was always congruent with the side of the target 
container, but this did not affect the results (see below), and the previous experiment 
had revealed no side bias. 
Coding and data analysis  
 The coding and analyses were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Inter-rater 
reliability on infants’ number of points to either location was excellent for a randomly 
chosen 6 infants, Cohen's Kappa=.80.  The third coder was at chance in predicting the 
location E1 would reach into in all test phases of all infants tested (one test phase of one 
trial could not be coded due to failure of the cameras directed towards E1), Binominal, 
p=.282.  
 4.3.2. Results and Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicated the main finding of experiment 1.  As depicted in the 
middle of Figure 2, infants pointed more often to the target container than the distractor 
container (respectively, mean number of points per trial, .377 vs. .184, Wilcoxon Signed 
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Ranks Test, Z=-1.89, p=.03). This pattern was stable across infants, with the majority of 
infants (47.4%) pointing more to the target container than the distractor container, and 
less infants pointing more to the distractor than the target container (10.5%), Binomial 
test, p=.033. Similarly, infants’ proportion of trials in which the first point was directed 
at the target container (Mean Proportion=.224) were higher than the proportion of trials 
in which the first point was directed at the distractor container (Mean Proportion=.114), 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-1.80, p=.036 (see middle panel of Figure 3).  Thus, 
infants informed the adult selectively about the aversive object in the container from 
which she was about to retrieve her toy, even when the saliencies of the containers were 
controlled.  Also the order of the containers on which E1 had acted first during the 
epistemic induction did not make a significant difference, neither with regard to the 
mean number of points to the target container, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-.99, 
p=.321, nor with regard to the number of infants that pointed at least once to the target 
container, McNemar, p=.774.  Thus infants did not attend to or remembered the target 
container better when it was acted on first or second. 
 As before, there was also no indication that infants learnt the target behavior 
over trials.  Infants tended to point to the target equally often in the first and in the 
second half of the experiment (respectively, mean number of points per trial .32 vs. .45), 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-.79, p=.427.  Eight of the 11 infants who pointed at 
least once (73%) pointed on the first trial.  The first point in the first trial was more 
often directed towards the target container (5/8) than the distractor container (3/8), but 
this did not reach statistical significance, Binominal test, p=.36.  Additional analyses 
revealed that infants' pointing to the target container was not biased by the side of the 
experimenter's entrance, (mean number of points per trial, same side= .500 vs. different 
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side= .591, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-.33, p=.739).  Infants in Experiment 2 
pointed overall slightly less compared to Experiment 1, possibly reflecting individual 
differences in the spontaneous use of pointing.  However a direct comparison on the 
mean number of points across the two experiments revealed no significant differences, 
Mann-Whitney U, Z=-1.53, p= .138, two-tailed.   
 Thus, in two experiments infants informed the adult selectively about an 
aversive object in the container they expected her to act on according to her false belief.  
Had they expected the adult to have no representation of the object's location 
whatsoever, infants should have guessed at chance which container she would approach.  
That is, if infants had intervened based on attributing ignorance instead of false belief, 
they should have informed the adult about the aversive materials in both containers 
equally.  In order to test this prediction directly, we administered an Ignorance-
condition in Experiment 3.  
4.4. Experiment 3 
 In Experiment 3 we tested whether infants would correctly attribute ignorance to 
an adult who did not know in which of the two containers her toy was and whether, in 
contrast to the false belief conditions, infants would inform the adult about the aversive 
objects in both locations equally. 
 4.4.1.  Method 
Participants 
 Nineteen 18-month-olds (10 boys; M age= 18;20, range = 18;7-18;27) 
participated in the study. Five additional infants had to be excluded from analyses, 
because of fussiness (3) or experimenter error (2).  Thirteen individual trials of 11 
infants had to be discarded, because of experimenter error (5) or fussiness (8). 
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Set-up and Materials 
 The set-up and the materials were exactly the same as in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 2 except for a minimal change 
during the epistemic induction.  After E1 put the toy into one container (henceforward 
also called target container) and said “Well, I leave it here.  See, there it is” she simply 
took the toy out of the target container again.  As in the previous experiments, she then 
turned to the other container (henceforward also called distractor container), reached 
into it and said "Well, I leave this one empty. See it is empty."  The order was 
counterbalanced as in Experiment 2.  Subsequently, she stood up and said as in 
Experiment 1 and 2 “Okay, I'll be back in a bit".  At that moment, E2 appeared from 
behind the room divider and E1 and E2 greeted each other friendly.  E1 handed E2 the 
toy, clearly visible to the infant and said again to the infant “I’ll be back in a bit” and 
left the scene.  The switch started with E2 putting the toy into the target container and 
continued as in Experiment 1 & 2.  
Coding and data analysis  
 The coding and analyses were exactly the same as in Experiment 1 and 2.  Inter-
rater reliability on infants’ number of points was excellent for a randomly chosen 6 
infants, Cohen's Kappa=.84.  The third coder was at chance in predicting the location E1 
would reach into in all test phases of all infants tested, Binominal, p=.45.   
 4.4.2. Results and Discussion 
 As depicted on the right Figure 2, infants pointed equally often to the target 
container and the distractor container (respectively, mean number of points per trial .439 
vs. .461, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-.21, p=.838).  This pattern was stable across 
18-month-olds attribute false beliefe, not ignorance 
96 
 
infants, with most infants pointing equally much to both containers (47.3%), and about 
the same number of infants pointing more to the target than the distractor container 
(21.1%) or more to the distractor than the target container (31.6%), Binomial test, 
p=.754.  Similarly, infants’ first points were equally likely to be directed to the target 
container (mean proportion of trials with a first point to the target= .25) or to the 
distractor container (mean proportion of trials with a first point to the distractor= .25), 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=-.28, p=.778 (see left panel of Figure 3).  Thus, infants 
indeed expected the adult to reach into either container in order to retrieve the toy, and 
informed her correspondingly about the aversive objects in both containers equally. 
 When looking only at the first trial, 79% (11/14) of the pointing infants pointed 
on that trial.  The first point in the first trial was equally often directed towards the 
target container (5/10) or the distractor container (5/10), Binominal test, p=1, and one 
infant pointed with both arms to both containers at the same time.  Additional analyses3
 
 
revealed that infants' pointing to the target container was not biased by the side of the 
experimenter's entrance, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, Z=0, p=1 (two-tailed; mean 
number of points per trial to congruent side= .441 vs. incongruent side= .471), and the 
order of containers on which E1 acted first did not make a significant difference, neither 
with regard to the mean number of points per trial to the target container, Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test, Z=-1.19, p=.233, nor with regard to the number of infants that 
pointed at least once to the target container, McNemar, p=.375.  
                                                 
3 A 2x2 ANOVA with Experiment as between-subjects factor and Location (target vs. distractor) as 
within-subjects factor revealed a significant interaction effect between Condition and Location, F(2, 54) = 
2.66, p = .04. Infants pointed more to the target container than to the distractor container in Experiment 1, 
(t(18)=3.026, p=.004) and Experiment 2 (t(18)=1.871, p=.039), but not in Experiment 3, (t(18)=-.218, 
p=.83). 
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4.5. General Discussion 
 The current study teased apart false belief and ignorance-based interpretations of 
infants' prospective informing in an action-based anticipation paradigm. In Experiment 
1 and 2 infants informed an adult selectively about the container which the adult falsely 
believed held her toy.  Importantly, the procedure excluded a "pull of the real", since the 
toy had been removed from the scene all together (see Southgate et al., 2007).  
Therefore it is unlikely that infants expected the adult to make a mistake due to her lack 
of knowledge - since both locations were wrong.  Thus, if infants would have attributed 
only ignorance or followed the rule ‘doesn’t know - gets it wrong’ (Ruffman, 1996; 
Garnham & Ruffman, 2001), they should have informed the adult about both containers 
equally.  As Experiment 3 showed, infants indeed informed the adult about both 
containers equally, but only when the adult was ignorant about the location of her toy - 
not when she had a false belief about its location.  The specific procedures of the three 
experiments excluded also several other, lower level explanations which invoke the 
adult's or infant's first or last place of attention, the presence of the toy, or other saliency 
or order effects.  The findings thus reveal that infants expect an adult to make a specific 
mistake when the adult has an incorrect representation of reality - they inform her 
selectively; and that infants expect the adult to act at chance when she is ignorant - they 
inform her globally.   
 The current study further shows that infants were motivated to intervene 
spontaneously and make active use of their social understanding by communicating.  
Infants did not have to learn a behavioral response in advance, since the adult never 
pointed or engaged the infant in pointing before the experiment.  Infants also did not 
learn the behavior over trials, as the comparison of the first and second half of the 
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experiment showed.  However, not every infant pointed on the first trial.  At first this 
may seem at odds with the action-based helping study by Buttelmann et al. (2009), in 
which infants helped on a single first trial.  However, it is important to recall that that 
study excluded infants who did not show the response behavior.  In addition, in that 
study some of the infants reacted only after a prompt from another person.  When taking 
this into account, the percentages of spontaneous first trial helping become comparable 
between the studies.  However, it is also possible that infants more readily react to a 
mistaken action than that they intervene proactively before a mistaken action has 
happened.  Finally, in contrast to previous studies (Southgate et al., 2007, 2010; 
Buttelmann et al., 2009), infants in the current paradigm were not familiarized or trained 
on the response measure beforehand.  Thus, although our study shows that not all 
infants were equally motivated to point spontaneously on the very first trial, and that 
there was some indication of individual differences across Experiments 1 and 2, it is 
still a remarkable demonstration of spontaneous communication in a staged laboratory 
setting. 
 With regard to the cognitive underpinnings of infants' success on recent theory-
of-mind tasks, the current debate centers around the question as to whether the obtained 
results best fit a mentalistic interpretation or a behavioral rule interpretation. Do infants 
understand that the mind mediates between perception and action or do they instead 
follow behavioral rules that link one behavior to another?  Preschool children have a 
mentalistic ("representational") theory-of-mind since they can engage in, and verbalize 
their mentalistic reasoning even in the absence of behavioral situations that would 
provoke a reaction (Perner, 2010).  In contrast, there is no such evidence for 
prelinguistic infants, and so Perner (2010) has argued that theory-of-mind tests in 
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infancy are most parsimoniously explained by the use of behavioral rules.  One problem 
with the latter account is that it is somewhat unclear what these behavioral rules are, 
especially since they are often based on post hoc interpretations of specific task 
performances (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 2005).  Some of the previously formulated rules 
(e.g., "three-way-association", Perner & Ruffmann, 2005; "Doesn't know- gets it 
wrong", Ruffmann, 1996) have also been empirically refuted (Träuble, Marinović & 
Pauen, 2010; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 2010).  In Perner's (2010) more 
recent and general formulation, behavioral rules "capture the workings of the mind 
without mentioning the mind" (Perner, 2010, p.257).  In this case, mentalistic and 
behavioral rule accounts make the same predictions about theory-of-mind performance.  
Before being able to mention the mind, infants may thus have an implicit or practical 
'theory-of-mind'.  However, it is currently debatable how postulating two systems may 
be more parsimonious than assuming one, and what the developmental antecedents and 
consequences for each system could be (e.g., Apperly & Butterfield, 2009). 
 The current study demonstrates that infants have the skills of anticipating 
another's belief-specific action mistake before it is apparent in the overt behavior, and 
that infants are motivated to intervene prospectively through communication.  The study 
is in line with recently accumulating evidence from other infant 'theory-of-mind' studies 
(for recent reviews see Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010; Caron, 2009), and cannot easily 
be interpreted in terms of the specific behavioral rule that adults who lack information 
will commit a specific action mistake (Ruffman, 1996).  Thus, already before they have 
acquired language in earnest, infants actively use their theory-of-mind skills to 
communicate prospectively.  It will be important to unravel whether the underlying 
cognitive format remains the same over development, whether it is supplanted or 
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complemented by another system, and what the underlying nature of prelinguistic and 
linguistic social-cognitive representations are. 
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5. Epilogue 
In everyday life, we commonly conceive others’ behaviour as being driven by mental 
states such as beliefs – an ability referred to as theory of mind, or more generally, 
mindreading. The common finding in the last 30 years of research was that this ability 
developed around four years of age (Wellman et al., 2001). The debate, however, was 
recently revived by looking-based studies (e.g. Kovács, Téglás & Endress, 2010; 
Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 
2007), which suggested that theory of mind skills were already present in the second 
year of life. These studies revealed that even infants use others’ informational states, 
rather than their own, when watching others’ actions. However, existing studies 
focussed primarily on infants’ information processing capacities in which infants were 
merely passive onlookers of others’ actions, as opposed to active participants. The 
present thesis took a second-person approach to mind reading and investigated 
whether infants in their second year also actively use their sensitivity to others’ beliefs 
when interacting with other people. In particular, I asked whether infants would 
anticipate others’ belief-based actions and spontaneously communicate relevant 
information through pointing. Infant pointing was introduced as an advantageous 
method of testing mindreading abilities since it involves an overt response and hence, 
also involves a choice between relevant locations on behalf of the infants.  This 
method allows us to differentiate between self and other perspective in false belief 
paradigms. The results of the studies reported in this thesis (Chapters 2-4) revealed 
that infants indeed not only recognize others’ beliefs, but also actively use their 
appreciation of others’ beliefs in contextualized second person interactions.  In 
particular, infants’ spontaneous pointing behavior was shown to be dependent on the 
particular knowledge state of the adults with whom they were interacting. 
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 The first study (Chapter 2) investigated if 18- and 24-month-old infants 
correct an adult who is mistaken about the location of an object in anticipation of her 
searching in the wrong location.  Results revealed that both age groups corrected the 
adult when she was mistaken about the object’s location by pointing to the object’s 
new location.  In contrast, they did so significantly less when the adult knew about the 
object’s new location and when it was not her intention to find the object (Different 
action condition, 18-month-olds only).  This study provides evidence that, by 18 
months, infants take others’ intentions and knowledge states into account when 
responding to their actions. 
 The second study (Chapter 3) asked whether 12- and 18-month-old infants 
inform an adult about the reappearance of an aversive object in anticipation of her 
encountering it again.  Results revealed that the majority of infants in both age groups 
informed the adult when she was mistaken about the object’s location.  In contrast, 
they informed her significantly less when she either knew about the object’s 
reappearance, or when she had introduced the object as positive as opposed to 
aversive.  These results suggest that already by 12 month of age, infants tailor their 
responses to what others’ know or do not know.  In addition, infants were shown to 
take into account the adult’s emotional attitude (positive or negative) towards the 
object in their responses.  This is therefore the first study to show that preverbal 
infants can also use the pointing gesture to draw people’s attention to things that 
should be avoided (as is typical in the case of warning) as opposed to things that 
should be approached. 
 Finally, the third study (Chapter 4) aimed at directly investigating false belief. 
Since the results of the studies presented in Chapter 2 and 3 might also be 
alternatively explained by an ignorance interpretation, the logic of the third study was 
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designed such that a single testing situation was able to differentiate between false 
belief and ignorance interpretations. This study examined whether 18-month-old 
infants inform an adult differently about two contaminated locations depending on her 
holding a false belief or her being ignorant about the location of her toy.  Results 
showed that infants informed an adult specifically about the contaminated location 
which she falsely believed to hold her toy.  In contrast, they informed an adult about 
both contaminated locations equally when she was ignorant about the location of her 
toy. These results suggest that by 18 months, infants are capable of differentiating 
between a person who is ignorant versus a person who holds a false belief, and further 
that they intervene accordingly.  Together, these studies consistently show that infants 
use their theory of mind abilities and tailor their communicative acts accordingly.   
The majority of researchers investigating theory of mind development in 
infancy adhere to information processing accounts, which propose that infants come 
to grips with others’ inner motives for action through an inborn psychological 
reasoning system, association, or the application of rules (e.g. Scott et al., Perner, 
2010, Perner & Ruffman, 2005). However, these interpretations are based on 
experimental results which are stripped to the level of looking times. In contrast, the 
results of the interactive studies presented in this thesis (Chapters 2-4) demonstrate 
that information processing accounts fail to completely capture the full range of 
infants’ mindreading abilities.  
The recurrent finding that infants are able to communicate their sensitivity to others’ 
beliefs spontaneously and appropriately across different contexts, provides evidence 
that social processes as practised in second person engagements play a crucial role in 
the development of mindreading.  
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Whereas information processing accounts to mindreading (as well as looking based 
methods) are primarily concerned with infants’ comprehension of others’ minds, a 
second person approach incorporates infants’ responsiveness to others’ minds. This is 
not to say that associations or rules are not at all involved in infants’ productive 
mindreading abilities. For example, associations such as actor-object-location 
associations might very well contribute to infants’ success on various false belief 
tasks, including interactive tasks. However, by themselves, these associations are not 
enough to explain why infants are motivated to initiate communicative responses such 
as pointing. This becomes particularly clear, when one considers the fact that, in the 
current thesis, infants processed a whole range of object-actor-location associations 
throughout the experimental procedures which did not lead to pointing (see, for 
example, the Procedure section in Chapter 4), which made them point significantly 
less (Correct action condition, Chapter 2; No problem condition, Chapter 3), or which 
made them point at random (Ignorance condition, Chapter 4).  Associations alone are 
unable to explain the pattern of infant pointing across conditions.  It is more likely 
that infants learnt both when to point and what to point at through participation and 
engagement with others. Moreover, the first study (Chapter 2, Different action 
condition) showed that intention understanding is able to trump actor-object-location 
associations (see also Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Surian et 
al., 2007 and Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard & Gergely Csibra, 2011 for evidence 
against association explanations;  for evidence against rule-based explanations, see 
Träuble et al., 2010; Song, Onishi, Baillargoen & Fisher, 2008; Friedman & 
Petrashek, 2008). Thus, the evidence collected in this thesis goes beyond information 
processing capacities and demonstrates that, from the beginning of their second year, 
infants sensitivity to others’ beliefs is manifested in their own actions. According to a 
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second person approach, infants experience from the very beginning, that that they are 
the object of others’ attention.  It is through embodied interactions that they learn to 
act according to their sensitivity to others’ beliefs.  Such an approach is beneficial 
since it avoids the alleged distinction between mental understanding and behaviour 
(see Chapter 1).  The distinction can be eliminated if one adheres to the notion that 
perceiving others’ actions entails mentality.  This differs greatly from information 
processing accounts which view action perception as involving merely the processing 
of abstract features.  That is, infants’ processing of others’ actions is understood as 
being as much affective and mentalistic as it is cognitive. These assumptions further 
provide the opportunity to (a) describe and understand theory of mind development in 
a continuous manner, ranging from a minimal understanding (e.g. sensitivity to 
others’ attentional states) to a more complex understanding (e.g. justifying false 
beliefs) and (b) to avoid the division between first person experience and second 
person ascription. 
 Appropriately characterizing the exact level and nature of infants’ 
mindreading abilities still needs to be addressed in future research. The majority of 
researchers studying theory of mind currently agree that infants’ mindreading skills 
do not amount to adults’ full-blown mindreading in the standard sense of representing 
and ascribing (intentional) mental states with propositional (intensional) content. 
Instead, many believe that infants’ mindreading abilities can be accounted for based 
on more simplistic explanations, for example by asserting that a infants track belief-
like states (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Spaulding, 2011), only have perceptual access 
reasoning (Hedger & Fabricius, 2011; Fabricius & Imbens-Bailey, 2000), or are 
sensitive to others’ action affordances (Bruin, Strijbos & Slors, 2011).  Thus, the 
question that will likely take centre stage in future research is whether and to what 
Epilogue 
 107 
extent infants’ sensitivity to others’ beliefs involves full-blown mindreading or is 
achieved by other means (Hutto, Herschbach & Southgate, 2011). 
5. 1.  Conclusion 
In summary, the present thesis provides evidence that second person engagements and 
social interactions play a leading role in the development of mindreading.  The results 
showed that infants in their second year are not only sensitive to others’ beliefs when 
passively watching others, but also actively and appropriately respond to others’ 
beliefs in contextualized interactions.  This suggests that pure information processing 
accounts are insufficient in explaining mindreading abilities in infancy.  Such 
accounts might be better informed by embracing the assumption that behaviour 
cannot be separated from its psychological meaning, hence, behaviour-reading and 
mindreading develop concurrently along a continuum which begins with a simple 
understanding, and develops towards  a more complex understanding through 
experience in second person engagements. 
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Samenvatting
Als volwassenen interpreteren we het gedrag van anderen doorgaans door het 
toeschrijven van mentale toestanden, bijvoorbeeld geloofsovertuigingen. Deze 
eigenschap wordt ook wel ’theory of mind’ genoemd of meer algemeen 
’mindreading’. Uit onderzoek van de laatse 30 jaar blijkt dat deze vaardigheid rond 
het vierde levensjaar aanwezig is (Wellman et al., 2001). Echter, recente studies die 
kijkgedrag hebben gemeten, suggereren dat theory of mind-vaardigheden al veel 
vroeger aanwezig zijn (e.g. Kovács, Téglás & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005; Southgate, Senju, Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007). Deze studies 
hebben aangetoond dat kinderen al in hun tweede levensjaar gevoelig zijn voor 
verschillende mentale toestanden van anderen zoals bijvoorbeeld juiste aannames 
(true beliefs), onjuiste aanames (false beliefs) en onwetendheid (ignorance). Een 
beperking van deze studies (en hun interpretaties) is echter dat ze uitsluitend gericht 
zijn op het cognitieve vermogen van het kind om informatie te verwerken. De 
kinderen in deze studies hebben alleen passief naar anderen gekeken, maar hebben 
zelf niet actief meegedaan. Het doel van dit proefschrift is te onderzoeken of kinderen 
in hun tweede levensjaar hun gevoeligheid voor de mentale toestanden van anderen 
ook actief kunnen gebruiken als ze met iemand anders interacteren, namelijk in 
sociale interacties. De vraag is in het bijzonder of kinderen in staat zijn om hun 
sensitiviteit voor wat anderen weten of niet weten (de mentale toestand) expliciet te 
maken door wel of niet te wijzen naar dingen die binnen de interactie relevant waren, 
zoals speelgoed.  
 In de eerste studie is onderzocht of kinderen van 18 en 24 maanden oud de 
onderzoekster informeren over de verplaatsing van een stuk speelgoed, afhankelijk 
van haar mentale toestand (dat wil zeggen, de onderzoekster weet dat het speelgoed 
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verplaatst is  versus ze weet het niet) en haar intentie (de onderzoekster wilde spelen 
met het speelgoed of  ze wilde schoonmaken). Uit de resultaten blijkt dat kinderen in 
beide leeftijdsgroepen de onderzoekster informeren over de verplaatsing van het 
speelgoed door te wijzen naar de nieuwe plek – maar alleen als de onderzoekster niet 
weet dat het verplaatst is.  Ook als het niet de intentie van de onderzoekster is om met 
het speelgoed te gaan spelen (maar in plaats daarvan schoon te maken), informeren de 
kinderen haar niet over de verplaatsing. Dit toont aan dat kinderen van 18 maanden in 
hun communicatie rekenig houden met de intenties van de ander en met wat de ander 
wel of niet weet (de mentale toestand). 
 In de tweede studie is onderzocht of 12 en 18 maanden oude kinderen de 
onderzoekster waarschuwen over de verplaatsing van een aversief voorwerp. Tijdens 
het onderzoek speelde de onderzoekster met een knikkerbaan, vond daarbij een vies 
voorwerp en ruimde het op. Vervolgens werd het voorwerp door een tweede 
onderzoekster weer teruggelegd, toevallig op dezelfde plaats als voorheen. Dan keert 
de eerste onderzoeker weer terug en wil doorgaan met spelen. De resultaten laten zien 
dat beide leeftijdsgroepen naar het vieze voorwerp wijzen indien de onderzoekster 
niet weet dat het voorwerp weer terug werd gelegd. Echter, de kinderen wijzen 
significant minder naar het voorwerp als de onderzoekster weet dat het aversieve 
voorwerp terug werd gelegd of als de onderzoekster het voorwerp niet vies vond maar 
juist positief waardeerde: ze vond het mooi of zacht. Deze resultaten laten zien dat 
kinderen niet alleen hun reacties aanpassen aan wat hun interactiepartner wel of niet 
weet, maar dat ze daarnaast ook rekening houden met de emotionele houding 
(positieve of negatieve waardering) van hun interactiepartner.  
In de derde en laatste studie werd specifiek gekeken naar de mentale toestand 
’onjuiste aanname’ (false belief) in vergelijking met ’onwetendheid’ (ignorance). Het 
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onderzoek begint met een onderzoekster die met een speelgoed speelt in twee dozen 
die naast de tafel staan. Voordat ze even weggaat, ruimt ze een vies voorwerp op en 
laat ze haar speelgoed op één van twee dozen achter. Tijdens haar afwezigheid komt 
een tweede onderzoekster, neemt het speelgoed mee en plaatst tijdens het 
schoonmaken in beide dozen een vies voorwerp en gaat weer weg.  Als de tweede 
onderzoekster weg is komt de eerste onderzoekster weer binnen en wil doorgaan met 
spelen. De vraag is of 18 maanden oude kinderen de onderzoekster  informeren over 
het vies voorwerp in de doos waarin ze haar speelgoed verwacht. Het blijkt dat 
kinderen bij terugkomst van de onderzoekster inderdaad vooral naar het vies 
voorwerp in de doos wijzen waarop de onderzoekster denkt haar speelgoed weer te 
kunnen pakken. Echter, wanneer de onderzoekster vlak voor ze weggaat het 
speelgoed aan de tweede onderzoekster overhandigt (en dus onwetend is over waar 
het speelgoed precies geplaatst gaat worden), wijzen de kinderen bij terugkomst naar 
de viese voorwerpen in beide dosen even vaak. Dit laat zien dat kinderen een verschil 
maken tussen onjuiste aannames (false belief) en onwetendheid (ignorance) en dat ze 
dienovereenkomstig reageren.  
Samenvattend laat dit proefschrift zien dat kinderen onderscheid maken tussen 
een interactiepartner die een ‘false belief‘ of een ‘true belief‘ heeft of ‘ignorant‘ is en 
bovendien dat ze hiermee gepast om kunnen gaan door behulpzame informatie te 
verstrekken. Deze resultaten zijn echter niet goed te verklaren vanuit cognitieve 
informatieverwerkingstheorieën. De bevinding dat kinderen hun gevoeligheid voor 
mentale toestanden van anderen ook spontaan kunnen gebruiken in verschillende 
communikatieve situaties, zoals alledrie de studies uitwijzen, bewijst dat sociale 
processen een cruciale rol spelen in de ontwikkeling van theory of mind 
vaardigheden.
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